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ABSTRACT 
Investigating the Neuropsychological Bases of Script Knowledge:  
Differential Effects of Executive Dysfunction and Semantic Impairment in Dementia 
Stephanie A. Cosentino, M.S. 
Douglas L. Chute, Ph.D. 
 
 
 
Objectives:  Scripts, or multi-step plans of behavior characterized by typical objects, actions, 
and locations, serve as important links between knowledge of the world and goal directed behavior.  
Existing research on the neuropsychological basis of script knowledge posits that scripts are stored as 
unitary knowledge structures in the prefrontal cortex.  However, patterns of impaired script knowledge 
in patients with prefrontal compromise suggest that scripts are likely multidimensional in nature, 
supported by multiple neural networks.  The main goal of the current study was to systematically 
explore this idea, and specifically, to assess the extent to which executive and semantic processes 
support script knowledge.  Methods:  A novel test was created to dissociate the role of executive 
functioning and semantic knowledge in script knowledge.  This test was administered to patients with 
various types dementia affecting prefrontal and temporal cortex, including Alzheimer’s disease (n = 
15) and subtypes of frontotemporal dementia [semantic dementia (SD; n = 13); behavioral disorder 
dysexecutive (BDD; n = 12)].  Results:  Consistent with predictions, patients with BDD exhibited 
significantly more errors of script organization/sequencing than errors of semantic content, and these 
errors were correlated most highly with performance on tests of executive functioning.  Further, 
patients with BDD made significantly more sequencing errors than patients with AD.  Patients with 
AD and SD were predicted to make significantly more semantic errors than sequencing errors, 
however, results did not support this dissociation.  It is likely that impaired semantic knowledge in 
these groups led patients to commit a similar number of semantic and sequencing errors since the test 
was administered in verbal format.    Conclusions:    Collectively, findings from the current study 
implicate the involvement of at least two large-scale neural networks in sustaining script knowledge, 
and suggest that there are multiple ways in which this knowledge can deteriorate.  This multi-
dimensional view of script knowledge is inconsistent with the view that scripts are stored as unitary 
knowledge structures in the prefrontal cortex.  
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CHAPTER 1:  INTRODUCTION 
 
Scripts: Links Between Knowledge and Behavior 
As an abstract concept, a script is difficult to define in concrete terms.  For current purposes, 
it will be defined as a multi-step, goal-oriented, plan of action consisting of a set of typical (though not 
necessarily essential) objects, locations, and actions.  For example, a script such as ‘going fishing’ 
frequently includes objects such as a fishing rod, fishing line, and bait. It is also generally confined to a 
location characterized by a body of water (lake, pond, river, ocean), and typical actions such as casting 
the fishing line and pulling the line out of the water.  Finally, all actions are geared toward 
accomplishing the overarching goal of catching a fish.  
 There is considerable interest in both cognitive psychology and neuropsychology regarding 
the nature of scripts, and their role in facilitating human thought and behavior.  Several decades ago, 
cognitive theorists coined the term “script” in reference to a large-scale abstract knowledge unit 
entailing the typical action sequence, objects, role players, and locations associated with an event 
(Schank & Abelson, 1977).  Over the past decade, the neuropsychological basis of script knowledge 
has been gaining more attention (Allain, LeGall, Etcharry-Bouyx, Aubin, & Emile, 1999; Buxbaum, 
Schwartz, & Carew, 1997; Cazalis, Azouvi, Sirigu, Agar, & Burnoud, 2001; Funnell, 2001; Godbout & 
Doyon, 1995, 2000; Grafman, 1989; Grafman et al., 1991; Lojek-Osiejuk, 1996; Sirigu et al., 1995, 
1996).  Patient groups with prefrontal deficits resulting from head trauma or dementia frequently 
demonstrate impaired ability to successfully carry out goal directed, sequential behavior (Allain et al., 
1999; Godbout & Doyon, 1995, 2000; Grafman et al., 1991; Sirigu et al., 1995, 1996).  As such, there 
has been growing interest in articulating the extent to which prefrontal dysfunction is associated with 
impaired knowledge for scripts.  
While patients with prefrontal deficits display poor organization of script actions, these 
patients tend to have preserved knowledge of script content (e.g., the objects and actions within a 
script).  It is generally assumed that a separate store of semantic information underlies this preservation 
of knowledge.  However, there is surprisingly little research dedicated to understanding the role that 
semantic knowledge plays in facilitating execution of a given script.  In interpreting impaired script 
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knowledge in a sample of patients with Alzheimer’s disease (AD), Grafman and colleagues (1991) 
comment that semantic degradation is likely as relevant as executive dysfunction.   Funnell (2001) 
extends Grafman’s perspective, arguing that scripts are largely semantic, and provide a context in 
which objects obtain meaning.  Specifically, Funnell theorizes that scripts provide “perceptual and 
functional information about objects together with associated information about typical place and time, 
actions, and actors, and other involved objects” (336).     
While it is clear that executive abilities and semantic knowledge play a role in representing 
scripts, identifying the neuropsychological bases of a large-scale knowledge structure such as a script 
is a challenging task.  The current study sought to explore the way in which these neuropsychological 
functions interact in the form of a script to allow for organized and purposeful behavior.  Ideally, this 
could shed light on the nature of behavioral disorganization in various clinical populations, and 
provide insight regarding the conceptualization and treatment of such behavior. 
 
Script Knowledge in Dementia 
Given the distribution of neuropathology in frontotemporal dementia and Alzheimer’s 
disease, these patient groups presented the opportunity to study the effects of executive dysfunction 
and semantic impairment on script knowledge.   
 
Frontotemporal Dementia 
 Frontotemporal dementia (FTD) is a neurodegenerative disease characterized by a wide range 
of clinical presentations and several distinct histopathologic conditions (Grossman, 2002).  
Traditionally, FTD has been referred to as Pick’s disease, based on Alois Alzheimer’s original 
documentation of pathologic changes that included swollen cells (Pick cells) and intraneuronal 
inclusions (Alzheimer, 1911 as cited in Grossman, 2002).  The clinical syndrome of FTD, however, is 
now known to result from a number of different neuropathologic conditions, with the presence of Pick 
bodies and cells being non-essential for diagnosis.  Constantinidis (1985) proposed a classification 
system outlining the three major types of pathologic features seen in association with the clinical 
presentation of FTD, all of which include neuronal drop-out and microvaculation.  Type A 
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histopathology refers to Pick’s bodies and swollen Pick cells (classic Pick’s disease), while Type B 
includes only swollen Pick cells (Corticobasal degeneration).  Finally, Type C is alternately referred to 
as frontotemporal dementia of the non-Alzheimer’s type or dementia lacking distinctive histopathology 
(DLDH).  Specific sets of clinical features have not yet been reliably associated with one type of 
pathology (McKhann et al., 2001).  In the current study, the term FTD will be used to describe the 
clinical presentation of the disease only.    
FTD, the onset of which is typically a decade earlier (mean age = 62) than that of Alzheimer’s 
disease, does not increase in frequency with advancing age (Grossman, 2002).  In a recent report on the 
clinical and pathological diagnosis of FTD, McKhann and colleagues (2001) outlined two general 
clinical presentations observed in patients with FTD.  Most common, is an early change in social 
conduct and personality to include impulsive and inappropriate behavior (e.g., swearing, shoplifting), 
lack of concern for personal appearance and hygiene, lack of inhibition (e.g., grabbing food from 
another’s plate), and inappropriate sexual behavior.  Cognitive deficits primarily in the area of 
executive functioning frequently occur in conjunction with behavioral disturbance.  This subgroup of 
FTD patients will be referred to as the Behavioral Disorder and Dysexecutive (BDD) subtype of FTD. 
A second general presentation of FTD is characterized by language dysfunction of two 
specific types:  progressive non-fluent aphasia (PNFA) and semantic dementia (SD).  Patients with 
PNFA experience gradual loss of spontaneous speech with eventual mutism.  Other areas of language 
are found to suffer, including sentence and grammatical comprehension, naming, and repetition.  
However, knowledge for the meaning of words is generally spared.  Semantic dementia, in contrast, is 
characterized by progressive loss of knowledge for the meaning of words in the context of relatively 
fluent speech.   
The current study focused on FTD patients with BDD and SD.  These selection criteria were 
based on the relevance of the cognitive and behavioral profile of these patient groups (discussed in 
more detail below), in elucidating the effects of executive dysfunction and semantic impairment on 
script knowledge. Patients with PNFA were not included as their primary deficit is the impairment of 
fluent, spontaneous speech.  While the relationship between such deficits and script knowledge may be 
a subject for future study, it is beyond the scope of the current investigation.    
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Behavioral Disorder and Dysexecutive Syndrome 
 Behavioral disorder and dysexecutive (BDD) syndrome is perhaps the most commonly 
recognized subtype of FTD.  Such patients are rather easily distinguished from those with other forms 
of dementia, based largely on their distinctive impairment in social conduct, marked changes in 
personality, and disruptive behavior.  In addition to the impulsive and inappropriate behaviors 
described earlier, BDD is typically characterized by apathy or irritability, lack of empathy, loss of 
initiative, irregular eating behavior (e.g., attempts to eat inedible objects, overeating, and food fads in 
which only certain foods are eaten).  Emotional dysfunction and psychiatric symptoms such as atypical 
depression, psychosis, and mania have also been reported in patients with BDD (Gregory & Hodges, 
1993; Grossman, 2002; Miller, Cummings, & Villanueva-Meyer, 1991; Neary, Snowden, Northen, & 
Goulding, 1988).   
 Given this rich profile of dysexecutive behavior, it is not surprising that BDD is frequently 
accompanied by cognitive deficits including impulsive and inflexible thought, poor attention, deficient 
reasoning and judgment, and poor planning (Boone et al., 1999; Grossman, 2002; Hodges et al., 1999; 
Rahman, Sahakian, Hodges, Rogers, & Robbins, 1999).   Interestingly, there have been contradictory 
findings regarding the extent to which patients with BDD display impairment on traditional 
neuropsychological tests of executive functioning.  Several studies demonstrate little evidence of 
deficit on tests such as the Wisconsin Card-Sorting Test (WCST; Grant & Berg, 1981) in patients 
presenting at an early stage of the disease (Gregory, Serra-Mestres, & Hodges, 1999; Rahman et al., 
1999).   
This temporary preservation of executive skills in the context of severe behavioral disturbance 
likely reflects the functional and anatomic diversity of the prefrontal cortex.   While damage to the 
ventromedial cortex (VMC) has been associated with behavioral and emotional dysregulation, 
executive dysfunction in cognitive terms has been more closely associated with damage to the 
dorsolateral cortex (DLC).  As such, it may be reasonable to suppose that patients with preserved 
cognition may suffer primarily from deterioration of the VMC in comparison to the DLC.   
In general, however, patients with BDD eventually display executive dysfunction on 
neuropsychological testing (Grossman, 2002; Hodges et al., 1999; Pachana, Boone, Miller, Cummings, 
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& Berman, 1996).  This pattern of decline coincides with a number of neuroimaging studies that 
document little structural or metabolic abnormality in the early stage of the disease (Gregory et al., 
1999; Grossman, 2002), yet marked changes as the disease progresses.  In particular, BDD is 
eventually characterized by reduced blood flow bilaterally to the VMC and DLC, as well as bilateral 
frontal atrophy seen on MRI (Jagust, Reed, Seab, Kramer, & Budlinger, 1989; Starkstein et al., 1994).   
The mutual decline of cognition and behavior following the mild stage of the disease 
generates interesting questions regarding the relationship between what we know and how we act.  
Theoretically speaking, scripts embody the interface between cognition and behavior.  Perhaps the 
breakdown of organized scripts, knowledge structures theorized by Grafman (1989) to rely on the 
integrity of the prefrontal cortex, contributes to deficits in social behavior seen in patients with BDD.  
Given the pattern of behavioral and cognitive deficits observed in BDD, it is reasonable to predict that 
such patients would demonstrate impaired organization of script actions, with spared knowledge for 
the content of a script.  If this type of dissociation were to arise in patients with BDD, it would lend 
support to existing theories that emphasize the contributing role of executive functioning to script 
knowledge (Grafman, 1989; Grafman et al., 1991; Sirigu et al., 1995, 1996).    
 
Semantic Dementia 
Semantic Dementia (SD), a second subtype of FTD characterized by relatively selective 
atrophy of unilateral or bilateral temporal lobes, has provided valuable information regarding the 
neuroanatomic underpinnings of semantic knowledge and the nature by which such information is 
processed and stored.  Although several case studies have documented temporal lobe atrophy more 
marked in the right hemisphere (Confraveux, Croisile, Garassus, Aimard, & Trillet, 1992; Evans, 
Heggs, Antoun, & Hodges, 1995; Hodges, Patterson, Oxbury, & Funnell, 1992; Tyrell, Warrington, 
Frackowiak, & Rosser, 1990), patients suffering from SD typically present with greater left sided 
temporal lobe degeneration. 
  SD is characterized by bilateral degeneration in the inferior and middle gyri of the anterior 
temporal lobes, with relative sparing of the superior gyri.  Generally, the hippocampi, frontal lobes, 
and parietal cortex are intact or mildly atrophic in the early stages of the disease (Snowden, 1999).  
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This pattern of deterioration has been associated with impaired semantic knowledge to include naming 
to picture (Bozeat, Lambon Ralph, Patterson, Garrard, & Hodges, 2000, Lambon Ralph et al., 1998), 
category fluency (Bozeat et al., 2000; Hodges, 1992), naming to definition (Silveri & Gainotti, 1988), 
providing definitions to both words and pictures (Lambon Ralph, Graham, & Patterson, 1999), sorting 
concepts according to category (Hodges, Patterson, & Tyler, 1994), discriminating between real versus 
unreal objects (Hodges et al., 1994; Sartori & Job, 1988), generating word synonyms (Bozeat et al., 
2000), and understanding the relationship between  objects and concepts (Bozeat et al., 2000, 
Mummery et al., 1999; Snowden, 1999).   
This pattern of deficits has led to the conceptualization of the temporal lobes as crucial 
structures underlying semantic knowledge.  Interestingly, despite the seemingly central role of 
semantics in script knowledge, patients with SD typically maintain the ability to execute scripts long 
after they display marked deficits in object and word knowledge (Snowden, 1999).  This is likely 
facilitated by preserved reasoning and episodic memory, as well as relative sparing of knowledge for 
superordinate categories that helps to mask more specific deficit. The preserved ability of patients with 
SD to functionally navigate the environment may be the reason that such patients often do not seek 
medical attention until more moderate stages of the disease.   
Despite generally preserved activities of daily living, however, there is evidence to suggest 
that errors of object substitution may degrade the integrity of scripted behavior in patients with SD. For 
example, Snowden and Griffiths (2000) describe a woman who poured bleach into a bubble bath, and 
another woman who had difficulty recognizing items in a grocery store.  These patients appear to have 
preserved knowledge for the routine of taking a bath and going shopping, yet demonstrate impaired 
knowledge of the objects within the routine. The extent to which such deficits are a product of 
visuoperceptual difficulty (apperceptive agnosia), impaired visual semantics (associative agnosia), or 
impaired verbal semantics (surface dyslexia) is not clear. 
Given the seemingly important role of semantic knowledge for objects and actions within a 
script, it would be reasonable to assume that patients with SD would demonstrate impairment on a test 
of script knowledge.  In contrast to patients with BDD, however, deficit should not be apparent for the 
organization of actions within a script.  Rather, patients with SD should be expected to display 
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impaired knowledge for the meaning-based content of a script.  That is, such patients might have 
difficulty identifying an object or action substitution in the context of an appropriately organized 
script.   
 
Alzheimer’s Disease 
 In 1907, Alois Alzheimer documented the first case of Alzheimer’s disease (AD) in a case 
study of a patient with memory loss, impaired language, apraxia, paranoia, and delusions.  Initially 
described by Alzheimer as a  “peculiar little known disease process”, AD is now thought to account for 
approximately 60% of all dementia cases based on estimates in Western Europe and North America 
(Zabar & Kawas, 2000).  Unlike FTD, the incidence of AD increases substantially as a function of age, 
nearly doubling with every decade after age 55.  The signature symptom of AD, early memory loss, 
reflects an inability to encode new information as a result of hippocampal deterioration (Zabar & 
Kawas, 2000).  As the disease progresses beyond the hippocampus into temporal cortex, deficits in 
semantic knowledge (e.g., impaired word finding, loss of meaning for words and objects) become 
more apparent.  The frontal lobes are also invariably affected, resulting in impaired executive 
functioning.  While AD and FTD share similar features, these patient groups are generally 
distinguished based on the pattern of symptom severity early in the disease course, secondary to the 
differential distribution of neuropathology.  That is, while early neuropathologic changes in AD are 
concentrated heavily in the hippocampus, those in SD affect the anterior and inferior temporal cortex 
most severely, and those in BDD are largely centered in the prefrontal cortex.   
 
 
Neuropsychological Profiles in AD and FTD 
A host of neuropsychological and neuroimaging studies have been undertaken to clarify the 
difference between these disease processes (Grossman et al., 1997, 1998; Pachana et al., 1996).  
Despite differential patterns of neural activation and cortical degeneration on neuroimaging, it has been 
relatively difficult to document clear and consistent differences in neuropsychological performance in 
patients with FTD and AD.  For example, Pachana and colleagues (1996) examined patients with AD 
 8
and FTD on a variety of neuropsychological indices.  Patients with FTD were selected if they met the 
following requirements: 1) frontal-temporal hypoperfusion with relative sparing of the parietal and 
occipital regions; and 2) gradual cognitive decline associated with prominent personality changes.  
(The latter criterion suggests that patients suffered from the so-called frontal variant of FTD referred to 
as BDD in the current study).  Patients with AD were selected for the study if they exhibited temporal-
parietal hypoperfusion with an absence (or mild level) of hypoperfusion in frontal and anterior 
temporal regions.  Both patient groups were found to perform below normal controls on almost all tests 
administered, including measures of executive control and memory.  Initially, no significant 
differences between the two patient groups were found on any of the measures.  Once tests were 
converted to standardized z- scores, however, the two patient groups exhibited different patterns of 
performance across neuropsychological measures.  While the AD group obtained higher scores on tests 
of executive control and lower scores on memory indices, the FTD group displayed the opposite 
pattern.   
 A study by Hodges and colleagues (1999) was able to more clearly identify 
neuropsychological differences between patients with AD and FTD.  The authors speculated that early 
research found few differences due largely to the inclusion of various subtypes of FTD patients within 
a single group, thus obscuring important differences in cognitive impairment.  Hodges and colleagues 
separated FTD patients with semantic dementia and primarily frontal variant FTD, and compared these 
groups to patients with AD on a variety of neuropsychological measures.  As predicted, patients with 
AD demonstrated significant deficit on tests of episodic memory with less severe (but moderate) 
impairment of semantic knowledge.  In contrast, patients with SD exhibited profoundly deficient 
semantic knowledge characterized by surface alexia and anomia.  Finally, patients with frontal variant 
were the least impaired on testing, showing mild deficits on measures of verbal fluency and episodic 
memory.   Hodges and colleagues (1999) concluded that the pattern of deficits across patient groups is 
consistent with predictions based upon the distribution of neuropathology in each disease process.   
 In sum, these subgroups of dementia patients consistently demonstrate impairment on a 
variety of neuropsychological indices when compared to normal control subjects.  Dissociations 
between the groups can be seen most clearly when the overall pattern of performance on multiple 
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neuropsychological tests is considered, rather than performance on a single measure.  Since patients 
with frontal variant (BDD) subtype of FTD tend to display relatively greater deficits in executive 
functioning, it would be expected that these patients would exhibit relatively impaired performance in 
the organization of actions within a script.  In contrast, both patients with AD and SD would be 
expected to show relatively more errors of semantic knowledge than executive function.   
 
The Structure of Scripts:  From Computer Science to Cognitive Psychology 
Before exploring the neuropsychological components believed to support script knowledge, it 
is informative to review the history of scripts, particularly with respect to the contributions of cognitive 
psychology.  Throughout the 1970s, efforts were made to develop computers capable of understanding 
human language and comprehending stories.  Initial programs failed for several reasons, one of which 
was the computer’s inability to make inferences about the information presented in the story (Dyer, 
1989).  That is, the computer was unable to prioritize important information, ignore unessential or 
irrelevant information, or make inferential connections between different parts of the story.  According 
to Schank & Abelson (1977), cultural knowledge of recurring social situations allows for this 
inferential process, and they introduced the term “script” to refer to the chains of causal inferences that 
connect stereotypic action sequences.   
In designing computer programs to represent these kinds of stereotypic sequences, it became 
necessary to identify the properties of scripts that allow for inferential processing.  Scripts were 
thought to have a standard setting (e.g., a restaurant), with an internal structure comprised of various 
scenes (e.g., ordering food, eating food, paying the bill).  In addition, scripts were understood to be 
hierarchical, with certain scenes holding more importance than others.  Finally, computer programmers 
acknowledged that objects within a script hold meaning.  Thus, scripts were determined to be 
sequential, hierarchical, and meaning based structures. 
Discussion of script knowledge within the field of computer science ignited curiosity 
regarding the cognitive basis of scripts.  Early psychological research sought to understand the way by 
which scripts facilitate inferential thinking, goal directed behavior, and the generation of expectations.  
In an effort to answer these overarching questions, significant attention was directed toward 
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articulating the “structure” of script knowledge.  Beginning in the 1970s and spanning the following 
two decades, a series of studies began to describe this structure, allowing for progressively systematic 
research on the nature of script knowledge. 
One of the earliest studies examining script knowledge assessed the nature of script 
representation in memory (Abbott, Black, & Smith, 1985).  Given the temporally based nature of 
scripts, it was thought that actions comprising a script are mentally represented in a strict sequential 
order.  In contrast to initial predictions, however, the authors found scripts to be arranged primarily in a 
hierarchical fashion.  That is, scripts are represented at a series of levels.  At the highest, most abstract 
level, is a script header, or a summary of the series of events (e.g., going to the movies).  Below the 
script header, exist a set of scene headers that refer to the superordinate actions within the script (e.g., 
getting popcorn).  Finally, scene actions represent the lowest level of the script (e.g., paying for the 
popcorn), connected to the script header via their scene headers.  
Within each level of the script hierarchy, actions appear to have temporal organization.  
Bower and colleagues (1979) presented subjects with a series of sentences describing distinct scene 
actions, examining the rate at which subjects read a target sentence.  According to a sequentially 
ordered representation of a script (e.g., Making dinner), reading of the target sentence (e.g., Tom dried 
the dishes) should be faster when preceded by an action closely related in time (e.g., Tom washed the 
dishes) than an action more distantly related (e.g., Tom placed the food in the oven). Unexpectedly, 
reading time and temporal distance were found to be negatively correlated in some cases, and 
positively correlated in other cases.  Close examination revealed that the different sentences reflected 
various levels of the script hierarchy, likely accounting for the non-linear relationship between 
temporal distance and reading rate.   
In an effort to eliminate this confounding variable, Smith (1981) separated scene actions and 
scene headers into two conditions.  In the scene action condition, increasing temporal distance between 
events resulted in increased reading rate until a certain point at which only a small non-significant 
increase in reading rate was observed.  However, in the scene header condition, reading rate increased 
consistently and significantly with an increase in temporal distance.  Smith made two conclusions 
based on this data.  First, both scene headers and scene actions are characterized by a temporal 
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structure.  Second, each level is characterized by differing temporal properties, supporting the notion 
that they represent different levels of a larger hierarchical structure. 
Early research provided important insight into the mental representation of scripts as both 
hierarchical and sequential.  Later studies, such as that conducted by Materska (1996), demonstrated 
the content and organization of scripts to be socially shared, emphasizing their fundamental role in 
human thought and behavior.  As predicted, Materska found that healthy subjects agreed on the correct 
and incorrect ordering of actions within a script, and had greater difficulty memorizing an ordered list 
of events as the rearrangement of the script became more marked.  Materska’s studies not only made 
explicit the common assumption that script order is generally agreed upon, but illustrated that 
artificially manipulating this order hinders meaningful representation of information.     
 
Script Attributes 
 As the nature and function of scripts became more clearly articulated over time, interest in the 
various attributes of scripts grew.  Galambos (1983) described core characteristics of a script or 
“activity”, outlining four dimensions of any given script: 1) distinctiveness, 2) centrality, 3) 
standardness, and 4) sequence.  Distinctiveness refers to the degree to which a given action is 
particular to an activity.  For example, fastening a seatbelt has high distinctiveness for driving a car, 
while listening to the radio is far less distinctive to this activity.  The distinctiveness of a given action, 
argues Galambos, has “the major function of helping the comprehension system activate the 
appropriate knowledge structure by which to understand a situation” (30).  Research with normal 
controls has found a high degree of intersubject agreement concerning the degree to which a given 
element of an activity is distinctive (Galambos, 1983).   
Alternatively, centrality refers to the degree to which a given action is necessary in the 
completion of an activity.  Turning the key and steering represent highly central actions, as they are 
necessary components of driving a car.  According to Galambos (1983), if an activity is represented in 
a hierarchical fashion, the most central action would be at the superordinate node, and should be the 
most easily accessible.   Galambos & Rips (1982) provide support for this hypothesis in a decision 
time task in which subjects were asked to decide whether or not a given action is part of an activity.  
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Subjects’ mean decision time was significantly less for elements of high centrality than for those of 
low centrality.  The authors suggested, “if the comprehension system can keep only a limited amount 
of information about a context available for a prediction, it would be useful if the most relevant 
information were the most easily accessed.  Such relevant information might include the main goals of 
the activity and the most important actions in the performance of those goals” (43).   
Standardness, the third feature of activities described by Galambos (1983), is the frequency 
with which an act is performed within a given activity.  Galambos and Rips (1982) demonstrated that 
measures of standardness and centrality are highly correlated, such that the more important an action is 
in the overall execution of the activity, the more frequently it will be executed.  Finally, the fourth 
feature of activities is sequence, or the order of actions in an activity.  As discussed earlier, this 
temporal sequence is secondary to hierarchical ordering (Abbot et al., 1995; Materska, 1996; Smith, 
1981).  In keeping with this model, Galambos and Rips (1982) found a significant effect of centrality, 
but none of sequence, in subjects’ ability to verify an action as a component of an activity.  That is, 
varying the degree to which an act occurred early or late in the activity did not affect subjects’ decision 
time, as did varying the degree to which an act was central to an activity.  As such, results support 
primary hierarchical organization of scripts based on the relevance of actions in accomplishing the 
overall goal. 
 
Script Variations and Sources of Error 
Over time, research continues to argue against a mental representation of actions 
characterized by strict temporal links.  On a practical level, this finding is reasonable considering the 
amount of flexibility often required to successfully complete an activity.  A rigid temporally based 
representation is inefficient in that it greatly limits the applicability of an activity.  For example, if one 
needs to drive to work, one must be able to accommodate a variety of extraneous factors, considering 
multiple paths that can be pursued toward the end goal.  Abelson (1981) emphasized the cognitive 
nature of scripts in distinguishing them from other theoretical constructs such as habits, highlighting 
the fact that scripts are not simply a series of memorized and set events.  In addition to learning a 
script’s constancies, one must also learn its potential variations and alternative courses of actions.  As 
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such, successful completion of a script places demands on one’s ability to implement a flexible and 
logical order of actions in working toward the end goal. 
Abelson (1981) lists eight factors that characterize potential script variations including: 
Equifinal Actions, Paths, Variables, Scene Selection, Tracks, Interference, Distraction, and Free 
Behaviors. It is helpful to address several of these concepts to clarify the ways in which scripts vary 
depending on circumstances, and the types of errors that present problems for the successful 
completion of a script.  Abelson emphasizes the malleable nature of scripts, referring to the 
phenomenon of Equifinal Actions, or the fact that several different actions can produce a given end 
goal.  Paths are the various ways in which this goal can be accomplished, depending on the given 
circumstances.   
The flexible nature of scripts places large demands on executive processes such as planning, 
and hypothesis generation, particularly if the script encounters an “error”.  Abelson (1981) theorized 
that errors occur as a result of unexpected Interference or Distraction.  Interference refers to the 
introduction of obstacles (removal of a precondition for an event) or errors (wrongful completions of 
an event) prior to the completion of a script.  Alternatively, a Distraction is an external event of 
enough salience to disrupt the course of the script and potentially terminate the script altogether (e.g., a 
thunderstorm during a baseball game).  Under any of these circumstances, an individual must possess 
alternative routes of action in order to successfully traverse the unexpected events. 
Depending on the nature of the script, the need to efficiently tackle an obstacle may vary.  
Abelson’s (1981) concept of Scene Selection refers to the degree to which scripts are determined by a 
given sequence of events.  For example, the sequence of actions in a “strong” script such as ‘baking a 
cake’ is relatively important, while a “weak” script such as ‘camping’ might entail less sequential 
specificity.  That is, the order in which one swims, fishes, and hikes does not affect the integrity of the 
script.  As such, sequential errors may be less relevant and/or apparent in the context of a weak script.   
Abelson (1981) provides a cognitive framework for conceptualizing different types of scripts, 
and differentiating among various errors that can occur in the execution of a script.  This raises 
questions as to whether certain scripts are more vulnerable to error.  For example, are errors more 
likely to occur in a weak script with less sequential specificity?  Secondly, do script errors result from 
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inability to recognize or adapt to an obstacle?  Research in cognitive psychology has laid a strong 
foundation for answering these questions.  Cognitive research has shown scripts to have identifiable 
structure, characterized primarily by a goal-based hierarchy, and secondarily by sequential ordering.  
This structure is not static, but is malleable and dependent on foresight and planning.  Without such 
flexibility, even minor interference could disable the execution of goal directed behavior.   
 Despite extensive research in cognitive psychology, relatively little research has attempted to 
tie the psychological concept of script knowledge to neuropsychological functioning.  Considering the 
crucial link that scripts provide between knowledge of the world and goal directed behavior, 
investigation into the neuropsychological basis of script knowledge may offer valuable insight into a 
number of clinical phenomena.  Improved understanding of script knowledge and its possible 
impairments might elucidate the etiology of deficits in activities of daily living, social interactions, or 
impaired organization of higher-level thought and behavior seen in various clinical populations.    
 
Neuropsychological Bases of Script Knowledge 
 Grafman (1989) was one of the first to elaborate on the neuropsychological bases of script 
knowledge, and the ways in which the concept of a script can assist understanding of both functional 
behavior as well as behavioral deficits.  He was also the first to postulate a direct link between the 
cognitive representation of a script and the neurologic basis of this representation.  In an effort to draw 
a distinction between terminology used in early artificial intelligence research and that used in 
psychological theory, Grafman introduced the term Managerial Knowledge Unit (MKU), to refer to 
large-scale knowledge units analogous to schemas and scripts.  He described these units as 
“psychologically real” representations of knowledge characterized by an “explicit chronological 
sequential structure”.  Each of these MKUs entails an “overlearned sequence of events, real or 
imaginary, that is retrieved automatically and has a beginning and an end” (109).   
In an effort to unite the psychological concept of the MKU with theories of cortical function 
and neurologic disorders, Grafman (1989) proposed the MKU as the predominant type of information 
represented in the frontal lobes.   This cortical area, he highlights, is the “final point of representation 
for modular and domain-referenced processes before a response is made to an environment or self-
 15
generated stimulus” (107).  Prefrontal damage may spare language, visuospatial function, memory, and 
semantic knowledge, yet severely impair the ability to “run through” an overlearned behavioral 
sequence or to coherently “respond” to the environment. Understanding frontal lobe deficits, proposed 
Grafman, requires a structural definition of behavioral sequences and a model detailing the way in 
which these sequences are represented cognitively and neuroanatomically. 
As such, the MKU model was proposed in large part to enhance the testability of script and 
schema theory as well as to offer a cognitively based model of frontal lobe information processing.   
Grafman (1989) theorizes that the MKU is represented as a network of nodes, each of which 
symbolizes a unique event or property (e.g., ordering food).  This network provides both temporal and 
semantic structure to the MKU.  In addition, each level of the MKU is characterized by a set of 
procedures, skills, rules, and conditionals.  Procedures and skills guide the behaviors to be produced 
(signaling to the waiter) in a given MKU, while conditionals and rules embody the relationship 
between events (e.g., if you signal to the waiter, he will bring the check).  Grafman (1989) proposes 
that the MKU operates in parallel with other representational systems such as the lexical and syntactic 
memory systems.  However, the MKU, containing the highest redundancy of information, is the most 
complex type of knowledge structure, encapsulating knowledge stored in the various other networks 
including the semantic network.  As such, MKUs are hypothesized to control and guide almost all 
aspects of human behavior.  
While Grafman’s (1989) model facilitates conceptualization of the MKU, or script, at a 
neuropsychological level, it is has been difficult to find evidence in support of the MKU as a unitary 
entity.  In a series of studies in patients with conditions such as focal brain lesions, diffuse traumatic 
brain injury, and dementia, Grafman and others investigated the applicability of MKU theory, and the 
relationship between damage to the prefrontal cortex and impaired script knowledge. Grafman and 
colleagues’ (1991) first investigation of script knowledge in clinical populations was a study 
comparing normal controls to patients with Alzheimer’s disease (AD).  Patients with AD are well 
known to suffer impaired ability to carry out routine activities once the disease has progressed beyond 
mild stages.  In an effort to investigate the extent to which impaired script knowledge is relevant to 
such deficits, Grafman and colleagues asked subjects to verbally generate actions within a given script.  
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Results indicated that patients with AD produced significantly fewer scripts and named significantly 
more events outside the boundary of a specified script than did normal controls.   
While the authors concluded that script knowledge is impaired in AD, they were unable to 
specify whether this was secondary to structural degeneration of script content, or to a problem 
accessing and verbalizing the information.  Furthermore, the widespread pattern of deterioration in 
moderate stages of AD prevents clear dissociation between executive dysfunction and impaired 
semantic knowledge in explaining the basis of deficient script knowledge.  The authors highlighted the 
fact that assessment of more focal damage, particularly of prefrontal and temporal areas, would be 
helpful in teasing apart these various deficits.  
Later studies followed this suggestion, utilizing clinical populations with more circumscribed 
lesions.  To clarify the role of the prefrontal cortex in the representation of familiar activities, and to 
assess the applicability of MKU theory, Godbout and Doyon (1995) administered a script generation 
task to normal controls (n = 13), patients with frontal lobe lesions (n = 12) and patients with post-
rolandic lesions (n = 9).  The authors were particularly interested in comparing the applicability of 
Grafman’s MKU theory with Shallice’s model of contention scheduling (CS) and the supervisory 
attention system (SAS).  In the “forward” condition, subjects were asked to generate actions belonging 
to a given script in chronological order.  They were also asked to produce these actions in reverse order 
in a second “backward” condition. The latter condition was included to introduce a “non-routine” 
activity with which to compare performance on the more routine activity of naming events in order.   
According to the MKU model, subjects with frontal lobe damage should experience deficits in 
the mental representation or organization of knowledge for activities.  In particular, such patients 
should experience difficulty integrating sequential information for any type of activity, routine or non-
routine.  In contrast, Shallice posits that the frontal lobes are more integral to the execution of non-
routine (backward condition) activities than routine activities (forward condition), as the former 
require regulation via the SAS.  As such, performance on the routine task should not be affected, but 
performance on the non-routine task should be impaired.   
Godbout and Doyon (1995) found that in the routine condition, patients with frontal lobe 
damage produced script actions with less contextual information and more sequencing errors than 
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normal controls.  However, in the non-routine backward condition, no differences were found between 
normal controls, patients with frontal lobe lesions, or patients with post-rolandic lesions, as all three 
groups made perseverative and sequencing errors.  The findings that patients have deficits in the 
organized representation of activities in general, and not only with the representation of non-routine 
events, support Grafman’s model over Shallice’s theory regarding the role of the SAS.   
The integrity of script knowledge is certainly related to the ability to organize actions into a 
meaningful sequence.  However, within this sequential structure, scripts are characterized by semantic 
content as well.  The work of Sirigu and colleagues (1995, 1996) considered the difference between 
these two script components in an attempt to articulate potential variations in script deficits.  The 
authors compared the performance of patients with prefrontal lesions (n = 9), posterior cortical lesions 
(n = 8), and normal controls (n = 16) on a script generation task (1995).  Results indicated that patients 
with prefrontal lesions demonstrated selective impairment in the sequential organization and 
prioritization of script actions, yet retained knowledge for the content of a given script.  As such, Sirigu 
and colleagues (1995) concluded that scripts are unlikely to be stored entirely in the frontal lobes.  
They reiterate that the prefrontal cortex is integral to the organizational components of scripts, or the 
set of “cognitive operators…constituting a metaknowledge or ‘grammar’ for logical and temporal 
order and cause/effect relations among events and actions” (315). However, the authors emphasize that 
semantic and lexical components of script knowledge, typically spared with damage to the prefrontal 
cortex, must be subserved by separate neuroanatomic structures.   
Sirigu and colleagues (1995) advanced understanding of the neuropsychological bases of 
script knowledge by more clearly specifying the role of the prefrontal cortex and bringing to light the 
role of more posterior cortical areas supporting semantic knowledge.  In a follow-up study (1996), the 
authors reproduced earlier results, supporting the distinction between script content and sequencing.  
They discussed this dissociation in terms of differences between semantic associations dependent on 
an “associative map” and sequential representations reliant on a “frontal map”.  According to these 
theories, information in the frontal map is stored as “an arbitrary sequence using the consequence of 
the action as a binding agent between context and action” (308).  Despite intact associative networks 
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for the content of a given script, patients with prefrontal damage may fail to establish causative links 
among individual episodes in a script, resulting in poor organization of thought and behavior. 
In sum, investigation into the neuropsychological bases of script knowledge has revealed 
several important findings.  Firstly, as predicted by Grafman (1989), patients with prefrontal lesions 
often perform poorly when asked to generate a series of actions included in a given script, to identify 
specific events within a script, and to sequence events within a script (Allain et al., 1999; Godbout & 
Doyon, 1995; Grafman, 1989; Sirigu et al., 1995; 1996).  This has been generally interpreted as 
evidence for deficient mental representation of routine activities, such that patients are unable to 
organize events within the overall sequential or hierarchical structure of the activity.  This deficit 
appears to apply to both routine as well as non-routine actions (Godbout & Doyon, 1995).   
While Grafman’s localization of the MKU to the prefrontal cortex has garnered partial 
support, evidence has also surfaced in favor of a more widespread neural network underlying script 
knowledge.  The existing research has also raised questions regarding knowledge for script content, 
and its neuropsychological basis.  In an effort to address this question, the current study will attempt to 
untangle the major neuropsychological components of script knowledge, namely executive functioning 
and semantic knowledge.   
In order to gain a full appreciation of the way in which executive functioning and semantic 
knowledge subserve script knowledge, it is necessary to deconstruct these very broad 
neuropsychological domains.  In reviewing the literature, the first aim will be to describe the functions 
of each domain, with attention to current theoretical debates in each area.  The second aim is to 
identify the precise ways in which semantic knowledge and executive functioning may contribute to 
script knowledge. 
 
Semantic Knowledge 
As first described by Tulving (1972), semantic knowledge refers to the component of long-
term memory containing knowledge of objects, facts, and concepts as well as words and their 
meanings.  The literature on semantic knowledge is characterized by a host of theoretical debates 
regarding the way in which knowledge of the world is represented in the brain.  Early cognitive models 
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postulated the presence of knowledge “networks” that serve the function of connecting discrete units of 
knowledge (e.g., a bird is an animal and a bird flies) to allow for integrated knowledge of the world 
(Collins & Loftus, 1975).  These networks were thought to underlie categorical object knowledge, 
connecting the category (e.g., bird) at the superordinate “node”, with the category members (e.g., 
robin) at subordinate levels. 
Case studies over time demonstrated that individuals can lose semantic knowledge for 
discrete categories with preserved knowledge of others (Saffran & Schwarz, 1992; Warrington & 
McCarthy, 1983, 1987).  This finding advanced the notion of knowledge networks, suggesting that 
categorical knowledge is distributed throughout various brain regions, possibly dependent on the areas 
initially involved in encoding information about the category.  For example, tools may be encoded in 
areas related primarily to functional significance (e.g., a saw is for cutting), while fruits may be more 
likely to be encoded in cortical areas integral to the interpretation of perceptual features (e.g., an apple 
is red).  Functional neuroimaging has supported these neuroanatomic distinctions (Damasio, 
Grabowksi, Tranel, Hichwa, & Damasio, 1996; Martin, Ungerleider, & Haxby, 2000). 
 More recently, Coltheart and colleagues (1998) proposed a dynamic semantic system in which 
several discrete knowledge bases interact to comprise what is cumulatively referred to as semantic 
knowledge.  In the authors’ conceptualization, semantic knowledge can be broken down to include: 1) 
non-perceptual (conceptual) categorical knowledge, 2) perceptual (attribute-based) knowledge, and 3) 
knowledge for modality-input.  This view of semantic knowledge provides a parsimonious account for 
a variety of clinical presentations throughout the literature in which patients selectively lose specific 
areas of knowledge (e.g., the visual attributes of animals).  Coltheart and colleagues (1998) were able 
to gather preliminary neurophysiologic evidence for distinct neural regions subserving attribute-based 
and non-perceptual semantic information in 12 healthy young adults.  EEG monitoring revealed 
differences in neural processing for these two types of information as early as 200 ms from stimulus 
presentation.   
These findings are relevant to current debates regarding the nature of semantic knowledge as 
a unitary, amodal system or a network of modality specific subsystems.  In resolving this debate, the 
authors emphasize the importance of considering test-specific demands in the study of semantic 
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knowledge.  That is, some may use the term “visual-semantic” deficit to refer to impairment in the 
visual modality of testing (e.g., pictures), whereas others might use this term to refer to impaired 
knowledge for the type of information tested (e.g., what does a giraffe look like?).  These are important 
points to consider when reviewing debates on semantic knowledge as an amodal versus multi-modal 
system.  The literature on this debate is extensive, and is beyond the scope of the current investigation.  
However, the role of testing modality is certainly a factor to consider when interpreting performance 
on a measure of semantic knowledge.  
 
 
 
Knowledge for Nouns versus Verbs 
There is also evidence that nouns and verbs are represented differently in the brain, and that 
knowledge for these words may deteriorate selectively in patients with focal lesions as well as in 
patients with dementia (Cappa et al., 1998; Grossman, Mickanin, Onishi, & Hughes, 1996; Robinson, 
Grossman, White-Devine, & D’Esposito, 1996; Rhee, Antequena, & Grossman, 2001; White-Devine 
et al., 1996).  Most commonly, verb knowledge has been associated with the prefrontal cortex, while 
nouns have been thought to rely more heavily on the temporal cortex (Bak, O’Donovan, Xuereb, 
Boniface, & Hodges, 2001; Damasio & Tranel, 1993; Zeki, 1991).  Robinson and colleagues (1996) 
observed a pattern of naming impairment in patients with Alzheimer’s disease (AD) characterized by 
relative sparing of nouns in comparison to verbs.  A later study assessed naming of objects and actions 
in patients with AD versus patients with FTD.  While both patient groups had more difficulty naming 
verbs than nouns, the discrepancy between the two word classes was significantly more marked in the 
FTD group, suggesting a key role for the prefrontal cortex in the selective representation and/or 
processing of verbs (Cappa et al., 1998). 
Recent work by Rhee and colleagues (2001) has shed light on potential mechanisms by which 
verb knowledge becomes degraded with impairment to the prefrontal cortex.  The authors assessed the 
applicability of several theories in accounting for the pattern of findings seen across subtypes of FTD.   
One account suggests that verb knowledge is dependent on both the left prefrontal and left temporal 
cortex as these areas are involved in action and the perception of motion. Another account emphasizes 
that grammatical properties, theorized to be processed by the left prefrontal cortex, are more complex 
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for verbs than for nouns.  A third account, based on the consistent association of the left prefrontal 
cortex with executive control processes, focuses on the demand for executive resources when 
processing verbs.  Specifically, while both verbs and nouns have semantic properties, verbs are 
theorized to contain a far greater amount of information than nouns, including rich grammatical and 
thematic properties.  As such, the processing of verbs would draw more heavily on executive resources 
including working memory, planning, selective attention, and inhibitory control.   
Consistent with past studies, Rhee and colleagues (2001) found that patients with FTD had 
greater difficulty matching verbs to pictures than matching nouns.  Interestingly, their performance on 
the noun-matching task fell to the level of that on the verb-matching task, only when the former was 
administered in conjunction with a secondary task (repetition of digits), thus increasing the demand on 
executive resources.  Furthermore, poor performance on the verb task was correlated with impairment 
on executive tasks including Trail Making Test – Part B (Trails B; Reitan, 1958) and the Stroop test 
(Stroop, 1935).  As such, overall findings appeared to support the executive resources theory of verb 
processing.   
However, in exploring patterns of impairment across various FTD subtypes, the authors 
determined that verb knowledge does not appear to be affected in a consistent manner.  Specifically, it 
was primarily patients with a behavioral disorder / dysexecutive syndrome (BDD) that were impaired 
in a manner consistent with the limited executive resources account.   In contrast, patients with 
progressive non-fluent aphasia (PNFA) exhibited deficient verb knowledge in association with 
impaired grammatical processing, while poor performance in patients with semantic dementia (SD) 
was speculated to result from degraded knowledge for the meaning of the word.  Therefore, while 
verbs appear to be degraded more noticeably than nouns in a variety of clinical populations, the reason 
for this dissociation appears multi-faceted.   
 
Knowledge for Object Use: The integration of nouns and verbs? 
 Relatively little attention has been directed toward knowledge for object use in the research 
on semantic knowledge.  Rather, object use tends to earn more attention from the literature on 
naturalistic action, often discussed with respect to the clinical phenomenon of apraxia.  Furthermore, 
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direct links are rarely made between knowledge for objects, knowledge for object use, and actual use 
of objects.  Buxbaum and colleagues (1997) conducted one of the few studies to shed light on this 
topic.   The authors systematically assessed performance on naturalistic action tasks in relation to 
performance on various tests of semantic knowledge for objects in two case studies.  The first patient, 
DM, presented with semantic dementia, demonstrating impaired declarative object knowledge yet 
relatively intact use of objects in daily life.  The second case, HB, displayed an opposite pattern of 
impairment, exhibiting poor performance in naturalistic action with relatively spared semantic 
knowledge for single objects.   
 Buxbaum and colleagues (1997) sought to answer two central questions: 1) Is semantic 
knowledge necessary for correct object selection and use; and 2) Is semantic knowledge sufficient for 
such activity?  Neuropsychological testing and assessment on structured tasks of naturalistic action 
suggested that the answer to both questions was ‘no’.  Despite DM’s semantic deficits, he 
demonstrated predominantly intact ability to correctly select objects for appropriate use, even in the 
context of visually and functionally similar distractor items (e.g., he correctly selected scotch tape to 
wrap a gift rather than selecting masking tape).  Alternatively, despite generally intact declarative 
object knowledge, HB made a host of errors on the task of naturalistic action suggestive of deficient 
access to semantic representations (e.g., attempting to secure a thermos lid on top of a mustard jar).  
The authors concluded that, “having the full complement of objects arrayed before him apparently was 
not a sufficient reminder of what was to be accomplished nor did these objects act as a “triggers” for 
the requisite acts” (240-241).  The work by Buxbaum and colleagues (1997) advanced understanding 
of the link between semantic knowledge and object use.  Based on these case studies, knowledge for 
objects and use of objects appear to have separate neurologic representations.  Specifically, the authors 
emphasized that correct object use in the context of impaired semantics is facilitated via sensorimotor 
information regarding the functional/associational elements of the object.   
Funnell (2001) offers another perspective regarding the preserved use of objects despite 
impaired object knowledge, arguing that the use of objects in the context of a given script precedes 
object knowledge developmentally.  In other words, as children encounter objects in the world as part 
of a larger event (activity), object use establishes a framework in which objects themselves obtain 
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meaning.  Over time, specific instances of object use in the context of an event are generalized in the 
form of script knowledge.  Funell emphasizes that object knowledge in isolation, independent of a 
broader event, occurs only at the most abstract level of semantic knowledge.  
Based on this theoretical hierarchy of semantic knowledge, neurologic insult would be 
expected to differentially impair object knowledge in the context of relatively spared object use.  In 
fact, the pattern of cognitive deterioration seen in patients with semantic dementia supports this 
prediction.  While patients gradually lose knowledge of context-free objects, they maintain the ability 
to carry out activities (scripts) in daily life with appropriate object use throughout the mild to moderate 
stages of the disease (Funnell, 2001; Hodges et al., 1992; Snowden & Griffiths, 2000).  The extent to 
which such activity is facilitated by intact sensorimotor routes versus spared semantic knowledge for 
object use is unclear.  One way to reduce the role of sensorimotor information is to administer 
neuropsychological testing that does not involve actual object use.  If patients have relatively preserved 
semantic knowledge for the use of objects as predicted by Funnell’s theory, they will demonstrate 
stronger performance on such a test than one measuring context-free object knowledge. 
 
 Executive Functioning 
Semantic knowledge, or the basis by which meaning is attributed to words and objects, 
comprises a large part of script knowledge.  However, knowing the meaning of an object, an action, or 
an activity is insufficient for the conceptualization or execution of a goal-oriented behavioral sequence.  
In addition to possessing a semantic content, scripts are characterized by a structure that is both 
hierarchical and sequential (Barsalou & Sewell, 1985; Galambos & Rips, 1982; Grafman, 1989).  A 
script’s structure is hierarchical in that it unites multiple events at varying levels of importance to 
create a progression toward a goal state.  The structure is also sequential, as these events must be 
ordered appropriately to achieve the end goal. 
In neuropsychological terms, the skills that allow us to hierarchically and sequentially 
organize thought and behavior are referred to as executive functions.  Although a broad and 
heterogeneous set of skills, executive functions serve the unified purpose of guiding meaningful 
behavior.  Essential aspects of executive functioning include attending to relevant stimuli while 
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ignoring irrelevant stimuli, strategically refocusing attention as needed throughout a multi-step task, 
planning and effectively executing a sequence of steps to achieve an end goal, monitoring progress 
toward this goal, and flexibly updating behavior depending on shifting circumstances (Smith & 
Jonides, 1999).  Impairment in any of these regulatory skills, or executive functions, would certainly 
disrupt the conceptualization and/or execution of a script, leaving behavior disorganized and seemingly 
incoherent.  The current study seeks to elucidate the way in which executive dysfunction in patients 
with dementia affects script knowledge.  In order to do so, it is important to first review existing 
conceptualizations, current debates, and persisting questions regarding the neuroanatomy and nature of 
executive functioning.   
Executive dysfunction and disorganized behavior are seen most frequently with damage to the 
prefrontal cortex (Fuster, 1980, 1997; Luria, 1966; Smith & Jonides, 1999; Stuss & Benson, 1984).  
Extensive work in non-human primates over the past century has sought to uncover the mechanisms by 
which this cortical area allows for multi-step, complex behavior (Brody & Pribram, 1978; Jacobsen, 
Wolfe, & Jackson, 1935; Pinto-Hamuy & Linck, 1965).  Pinto-Hamuy and Linck (1965) theorized that 
monkeys with lesions to the “lateral frontal” cortex (diagrams of the lesions suggest that lesions were 
confined to the prefrontal cortex) were impaired on sequentially based tasks due to an inability to 
mentally represent a structured sequence of steps.  Later re-examination of their work by Brody and 
Pribram (1978) suggested that task impairment was not due to the absence of a mental representation, 
as monkeys that had been given extensive task training prior to ablation of the anterior frontal cortex 
retained the ability to perform the task.  In contrast, those without previous training demonstrated 
difficulty learning and completing the sequence, becoming more easily distracted by irrelevant stimuli. 
The authors concluded that poor performance was partially the result of impaired higher-order control 
of stimulus response and organization.  That is, monkeys with frontal lesions failed to execute the 
sequential task because they could not inhibit performance of irrelevant actions.   
The above studies, representing only a small fraction of research in non-human primates, 
invite speculation regarding the underpinnings of disorganized behavior seen in various clinical 
populations.  Is disorganized behavior the product of impaired mental representation of a series of 
steps, or does it reflect disinhibition of steps irrelevant to the goal at hand?  Both deficits have been 
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implicated in the disorganized behavior of patients with frontal lobe lesions or disease (Carlin et al., 
2000; Fuster, 1980; 1997; Stuss & Benson, 1984).  However, a number of additional hypotheses 
regarding the etiology of executive deficits have also been proposed.  Given the complexities of human 
thought and behavior, it is not surprising that multiple explanations might account for executive 
dysfunction. 
In a comprehensive discussion of the anatomy, physiology, and neuropsychology of the 
prefrontal cortex, Fuster (1980) identified temporal integration as one of the most important functions 
subserved by this cortical area.  Patients with prefrontal insult appear to lose appreciation for the 
causative relationship among various steps in an event, demonstrating “little or no regard for either the 
origins of the succession or its goal” (1980, p.115).  Fuster (1997) later elaborated his 
conceptualization of the prefrontal cortex, arguing that it is integral in the ability to separate 
perceptions and actions into goal directed thinking, speech, or behavior.  With insult to the prefrontal 
cortex, thought and behavior tend toward concreteness, anchored in the present time by stimuli in the 
immediate environment.   
Other theorists and researchers have focused on the role of the prefrontal cortex in the 
strategic assessment and reconciliation of external conditions and internal goals.  Building on the early 
work of Bianchi (1922) and Luria (1966), Duncan (1986) identified several basic elements of a given 
behavior, including a goal list, action structure, and means-end analysis.  He hypothesized that 
performing any line of activity requires use of a goal list (i.e., goals to be achieved) to create an action 
structure by which to reach various goals.  Means-end analyses are then implemented to devise the 
most appropriate or feasible way of accomplishing each goal.  Actions are then selected successively 
during a “goal search” from a “cognitive store” of actions, according to their appropriateness in 
reducing the discrepancy between the current state and the goal state.  Frontal or prefrontal lobe 
damage, Duncan speculated, results in impaired ability to selectively discriminate between relevant 
and irrelevant actions during this goal search.   
 Clinical research in patients with prefrontal damage lends support to all of the above 
speculations regarding the role of the prefrontal cortex in guiding behavior through the planning, 
organization, and ordered selection of multiple steps to reach an end goal (Carlin et al., 2000; Eslinger 
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& Damasio, 1985; Petrides & Milner, 1982; Schwartz, Reed, Montgomery, Palmer, & Mayer, 1991; 
Shallice & Burgess, 1991).  Petrides and Milner (1982) compared performance on self-ordered 
sequencing tasks (verbal and visual) between patients with: 1) right or left frontal lobe damage 
(dorsolateral cortex with extension into the medial frontal lobe in some cases), and 2) right or left 
medial temporal lobe damage.  Patients with lesions to the left frontal lobe demonstrated the greatest 
impairment, performing poorly on both verbal and visual tasks.  Patients with right frontal lesions had 
difficulty only on the visual task, while the temporal lobe groups were unimpaired.  The authors 
discuss the considerable demand placed on organization and working memory during the self-ordered 
task in which subjects were required to carry out a sequence of responses (pointing to specific stimuli) 
while maintaining memory for previous responses.   The pattern of findings across patient groups 
highlighted the role of the frontal cortex, particularly the left frontal lobe, in “programming” and 
monitoring a behavioral sequence. 
Carlin and colleagues (2000) assessed frontal lobe functioning in relation to performance on 
the Tower of London (TOL), a neuropsychological task in which the subject is asked to manipulate the 
arrangement of several colored disks to achieve a configuration specified by the examiner.  The TOL is 
especially challenging in that it requires subjects to perform these steps within specific task constraints 
(e.g., using a certain number of steps, and moving only one disk at a time).  Further, the appropriate 
first move is often counterintuitive (e.g., moving the blue disk away from the desired location 
temporarily to allow for necessary intermediate steps).  As such, the TOL places demands on a host of 
executive functions including the generation of an efficient multi-step plan of action, working memory 
for future steps of the plan as the immediate step is carried out, inhibition of the most salient action, 
and continuous monitoring of performance to remain within the outlined constraints of the task.  
Carlin and colleagues (2000) compared performance between patients with frontal lobe 
lesions and patients with frontal lobe dementia.  Not surprisingly, both groups demonstrated marked 
impairment in comparison to healthy controls, requiring significantly more moves and longer time to 
produce the correct solution.  Interestingly, neither group displayed significantly longer “planning” 
time than the healthy controls.  That is, increased solution time did not reflect extra time needed to 
devise a plan of action.  Rather, patients initiated the action sequence at a “normal” rate, yet failed to 
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execute and complete the task in a manner similar to normal control subjects.  Carlin and colleagues 
(2000) interpreted this response pattern as evidence of a “trial and error” approach, in combination 
with an inability to inhibit inappropriate response selections.   
 Planning, prioritization of action, organized thought, and inhibition of behavior are essential 
to successful performance on the TOL.  In a large sense, the challenges of the TOL mirror those of 
every day life. However, the TOL lacks meaningful content or context, making it somewhat difficult to 
compare performance on this task to behavior in daily life.  Numerous standardized and experimental 
neuropsychological tasks have attempted to assess executive skills of planning, reasoning, and 
organization in a more “social” context.  One such task is the Picture Arrangement (PA) subtest of the 
Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scales (WAIS; Wechsler, 1997).  This subtest, requiring the arrangement 
of pictures into a logical story, places demands on planning, common sense reasoning, social 
judgment, anticipation of consequences, and temporal sequencing of events (Kaufman & Kaufman, 
1999).   
McFie and Thompson (1972) reviewed a host of studies linking poor performance on Picture 
Arrangement with prefrontal deficit, with particularly impaired performance in patients with right-
sided lesions.  In a prospective study assessing 143 patients with various localized cerebral lesions, 
McFie and Thompson were able to replicate this pattern, reporting that patients with right-sided lesions 
(most frequently to the temporal lobe) tended to obtain the lowest scores.  Interestingly, the group of 
patients most likely to leave the cards in the incorrect order presented by the examiner was the group 
with right frontal lesions.  Rather than rearranging the pictures, this group tended to provide a 
“haphazard account” of the incorrect ordering.  The authors interpreted this performance to reflect 
inability to make use of available evidence to correct a response that is wrong.   
 Kertesz and Clydesdale (1994) offer a similar interpretation of poor performance on PA based 
on differences seen in patients with Alzheimer’s Disease (AD) and Vascular Dementia (VaD).  The 
authors suggest that patients with VaD, a disease associated with subcortical disruption of prefrontal 
functioning, are relatively impaired on PA due to decreased cognitive flexibility.  This hypothesis is 
highly plausible as successful PA performance requires patients to mentally “release” themselves from 
the incorrectly ordered stimuli, impose order on the randomly displayed cards, hold in mind a plan for 
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the correct arrangement, and efficiently implement this plan without becoming distracted by other 
potential orderings.   
Performance on the proposed task of script knowledge is hypothesized to place demands on a 
combination of executive skills including selective attention, inhibition of irrelevant stimuli, organized 
thought, planning, and reasoning.   These processes are likely necessary for the discrimination between 
correct and incorrect sequences of script actions.  Specifically, in order to judge a sequence to be 
incorrect, the subject must attend to each scene in a systematic fashion, and search for an illogical 
relationship between two scenes.  Alternatively, the subject might rely on memory for the correct 
ordering of a given script, and compare this to the provided arrangement.  In either case, demands are 
placed on working memory, selective and systematic attention, and inhibition of various scenes as 
attention is moved from one scene to another.   
As deficits in such skills have been consistently associated with damage to the prefrontal 
cortex, it is predicted that patients with BDD will demonstrate particular difficulty discriminating 
between the correct and incorrect ordering of scripts.  Such difficulty is hypothesized to stem from 
executive deficits that prevent the organized assessment of the presented script order, and an inability 
to mentally rearrange the scenes for the purposes of comparing the order with a more appropriate 
order.  Further, BDD patients are predicted to have difficulty based on inadequate anticipation of 
consequences or appreciation for causal relationships, processes necessary for the discrimination 
between incorrect and correct ordering of scripts.  The majority of past studies have examined script 
knowledge by asking subjects to name actions within a given script, placing demands on active 
recruitment and verbalization of information.  The current study reduces such demands, allowing for a 
more direct assessment of ability to sequence items by asking subjects to simply identify incorrectly 
sequenced scripts.   
 
Rationale and Hypotheses 
Traditionally, scripts have been discussed in the context of cognitive psychology, as abstract 
knowledge structures facilitating human thought and behavior.  Neuropsychological research has 
highlighted integral roles for executive functioning (i.e., organized planning and reasoning), and 
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semantic knowledge (i.e., the assignment of meaning to objects and events in the world) in 
representing scripts.  However, few studies have investigated the extent to which semantic impairment 
and executive dysfunction differentially affect script knowledge.  The main goal of the current study is 
to explore this question.  The two remaining goals will be undertaken to more specifically detail the 
way in which executive dysfunction and semantic impairment degrade script knowledge.    In 
particular, are certain types of script sequences more susceptible to executive dysfunction than others?  
Finally, does semantic impairment equally degrade judgment of the script actions and objects?  The 
following hypotheses are proposed: 
 
Hypothesis I: 
a.  Patients with BDD will identify fewer sequencing errors than semantic errors. 
b.  Patients with SD will identify fewer semantic errors than sequencing errors. 
c.  Patients with AD will identify fewer semantic errors than sequencing errors.    
 
Hypothesis II:  Patients with BDD will identify fewer conceptually implausible script sequences than 
physically implausible sequences as the former are hypothesized to require increased reasoning. 
 
Hypothesis III:  Patients with SD will identify fewer object errors than action errors.  This prediction 
is based on findings that: 1) the ability to carry out script actions is relatively preserved in SD, despite 
the presence of object substitutions (Snowden & Griffiths, 2000); 2) patients with temporal lobe 
disease have greater difficulty with nouns than verbs (Bak, O’Donovan, Xuereb, Boniface, & Hodges, 
2001; Damasio & Tranel, 1993; Zeki, 1991). 
 
Hypothesis IV 
a.  Increased script semantic errors will be associated with decreased performance on measures of 
semantic knowledge.  
b. Increased script sequencing errors will be associated with decreased performance on measures of 
executive function. 
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CHAPTER 2:  METHODS 
 
Subjects 
 Patients were recruited from the outpatient clinic at the Department of Neurology at the 
Hospital of the University of Pennsylvania.  The aim of the study was to include: 1) 15 patients with 
Alzheimer’s disease, 2) 15 patients with Frontotemporal dementia (FTD) – Semantic Dementia 
subtype (SD), and 3) 15 patients with Frontotemporal dementia (FTD) – Behavioral Disorder / 
Dysexecutive subtype (BDD), and 4) 15 age-matched healthy controls.  15 patients with AD and 15 
normal control subjects successfully participated in the study.  Due to the rare nature of FTD, however, 
only 12 patients with BDD and 13 patients with SD were recruited for the current study. 
Patients with Alzheimer’s disease were diagnosed according to the criteria of the National Institute 
of Neurological and Communicative Disorders Association (McKhann et al., 1984).  Patients with 
Frontotemporal dementia were diagnosed according to a modified version of the Lund-Manchester 
criteria (The Lund and Manchester Groups, 1994; McKhann et al., 2001).  Patients meeting criteria for 
mild to moderate dementia were selected for participation, while those with severe dementia as defined 
by a score below 10 (Tombaugh & McIntyre, 1992) on the Mini Mental State Examination (MMSE; 
Folstein, Folstein, & McHugh, 1975) were excluded from the study.    Given the scarcity of patients 
with BDD, there was one exception made in this regard to include a patient with BDD who scored 9 of 
30 correct on the MMSE.  Exclusion criteria for normal control subjects included treatment with a 
sedating medication, presence of medical conditions including psychiatric illness, head trauma, 
neurologic injury, or other conditions with cognitive sequelae.   
 Across the three patient groups, there was no significant difference in age (M = 69.70, SD = 
10.43), years of education (M = 14.75, SD = 3.01), or total score on the MMSE (M = 23.45, SD = 
4.56).  While normal controls were matched for age (M = 72.00, SD = 9.13) and education (M = 15.4, 
SD = 2.41), the average MMSE score (M = 29.00, SD = 1.07) was significantly higher than all three 
patient groups.  Please see Table 5 for demographic information by group.  
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Materials 
Scripts Test 
Scripts were selected to represent a variety of activities ranging from instrumental activities of 
daily living (e.g., washing the dishes), to weekly activities (e.g., going grocery shopping), to social 
events (e.g., throwing a party).  Stimuli were initially matched for average word length and word 
frequency (See Table 2).  Scripts were then piloted in 10 normal controls [mean (standard deviation) 
age = 29.9 (8.6)] to identify ambiguous or poor items, to determine script frequency (e.g., How often 
do you engage in this activity?) and to determine script familiarity (e.g., How familiar are you with this 
activity).  Please see Table 3 for these ratings.   
Each script is represented by four actions.  For example, ‘Doing the Laundry’ is comprised of 
1) Carry Dirty Clothes, 2) Load Washing Machine, 3) Load Dryer, and 4) Place Folded Clothes in 
Laundry Basket.  To assist simultaneous viewing of all script actions and to reduce demands on 
memory, each script is presented in 20 point font on an 8.5” x 11” sheet of paper with the title of the 
script written at the top of the page, and the actions listed below in a vertical format, numbered one to 
four.  Actions are displayed in this fashion to assist the subject in making a clear distinction between 
each action in the script.  The majority of past studies have examined script knowledge by asking 
subjects to generate actions within a given script, placing demands on active recruitment and 
verbalization of information.  The current measure of script knowledge eliminates these demands, and 
may provide a more direct means of assessing whether patients can detect organizational and semantic 
errors within a given activity.   
The actions chosen to represent each script were selected on the basis of several factors.  As 
efforts were underway to develop a visual analogue for the script test, only actions that could be clearly 
represented in both verbal and visual format were selected. It was also important to choose actions that 
could easily be distinguished from one another in visual format.  For example, while ‘look through 
lens’ and ‘take the picture’ are both actions comprising “Taking a Photograph”, it is difficult to create 
distinct drawings of these actions.  Given these constraints on selecting script actions there was 
concern that script actions might vary in their “centrality”, or their level of importance in completing a 
given script.  As such, normal controls were asked to rank the centrality of each action on a scale from 
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1 to 5.  Mean centrality ratings were compared across script error types to assess the extent to which 
differences in centrality might alter the level of difficulty.  There was no significant difference in 
centrality across the object and action based semantic errors.  However, actions in the physically 
implausible script sequences were rated significantly less central than those in the conceptually 
implausible script sequenced.    Please see Table 4 for data across script subgroups.  Since subjects did 
not make significantly more errors for physically implausible scripts, we can assume that this 
difference in centrality did not increase the level of difficulty for these script items.   
 
Script Errors 
The original version of the Scripts test included 22 scripts, each presented in three separate 
conditions: 1) Correct, 2) Sequencing Error, and 3) Semantic Error, yielding a total of 66 items.  In the 
Correct condition, the script actions are organized in the appropriate order, and include the appropriate 
objects and actions for the given activity.  In the Sequencing Error condition, the four script actions are 
organized incorrectly, yet include the appropriate objects and actions for the activity.  Sequencing 
Errors are divided into two subtypes: Physically Implausible (n = 11) and Conceptually Implausible (n 
= 11).  A Physically Implausible error is one in which it would be physically implausible to accomplish 
the script in the presented order.  For example, in “Going Fishing”, it is impossible to “Drop Fish in 
Bucket” before having “Cast the Fishing Line”.  In contrast, a Conceptually Implausible error is one in 
which it would be inappropriate conceptually to perform the script in the presented order.  For 
example, in “Selling a Car”, it would not be appropriate to wax a car before washing it.     
In the Semantic Error condition, script actions are arranged in the correct order, yet include 
either an inappropriate Object (n = 11) or Action (n = 11).  An Object Error is one in which the 
appropriate script action is carried through with an inappropriate object.  For example, in “Going 
Fishing”, the Object Error is “Place Flower on Hook” rather than “Place Worm on Hook”.  That is, the 
action of placing something on the hook is correct, yet the object has been substituted.  In contrast, an 
Action Error is characterized by inappropriate use of the correct objects for a script.  For example, in 
“Sending a Letter”, an action error is “Place Stamp on Left Corner of Envelope” rather than the right 
corner.   There is no object substitution, yet the appropriate object is being used incorrectly. 
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Test Construction 
To assist the subject in establishing the appropriate mental set for each script, effort was made 
to leave the first action of each script intact.  That is, Semantic Errors were not placed in the first 
action of the script, but were distributed equally across the second, third, or fourth actions of the 
various scripts (this is true for all but one script in which it was necessary to alter the first action of a 
script in order to create a feasible error).  In order to avoid potential effects of error placement in 
comparing Semantic and Sequencing Errors, both types of errors were introduced into the same script 
action.  For example, in “Going Fishing”, since a Semantic Error was introduced into the second 
action (“Place Worm on Hook”), the Sequencing Error included rearrangement of the second action.   
The 66 script items were organized in a pseudo-random fashion. Preliminary script groupings 
were created to separate scripts into three sets (Items # 1 – 22, #23 - 44, and # 45 - 66) such that each 
script (e.g., “Going Fishing”) occurred only once in each set.  Each set consists of an approximately 
equal number of scripts in each condition (i.e., Correct, Sequencing Errors, Semantic Errors).  Within 
each set, scripts have a pseudo-random order to ensure that no script condition (e.g., Sequencing Error) 
occurs in consecutive order more than twice.  Additional adjustment was made to equate the number of 
Physical and Conceptual Sequencing Errors, and Object and Action Semantic Errors across the first 
and second half of the test.  
 
Test Administration 
The subject was instructed as follows: “Today you will be answering questions about different 
activities.  Each of these activities is made up of four actions.  The four actions should give you a good 
sense of the activity although they cannot cover all the actions needed to complete the activity.  Please 
decide if the four actions that are included make sense”.  In deciding whether or not the script makes 
sense, subjects were encouraged to consider the sequence of the actions as well as the content of each 
action.  For each item, subjects were told the title of the script.  If subjects had reading difficulty, the 
examiner presented the test stimuli orally.   
Subjects were then provided with one demonstration item (i.e., “Making Clothes”) in which 
each script condition (i.e., Correct, Sequence Error, and Semantic Error) was demonstrated.  They 
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were then given a practice example (i.e., “Ice Skating”) and asked to decide if the activity makes sense.  
In the practice item, incorrect answers were queried, and subjects were encouraged to examine the 
activity more closely for errors.  If the subject did not identify the error, the examiner provided the 
correct answer.  This was done to ensure comprehension of the task demands and to establish an 
appropriate level of attention to detail necessary for successful performance on the task.  If necessary, a 
second practice item was administered.  Additional instructions were provided in the case that subjects 
forgot the aim of the task, or needed clarification of the task requirements.   
 
Pilot Study Results 
The original version of the scripts test consisted of 26 scripts.  Four scripts were eliminated 
due to high error rates (> 25 %) in a group of normal controls (n = 8).  See Table 1 for demographic 
information of normal control subjects used in the pilot phase of this study. 
 
Semantic Knowledge 
1.  Pyramids and Palm Trees Test- Words version (PPT; Howard & Patterson, 1985):  The PPT is a 
measure of associative knowledge for objects in which subjects are presented with a target item and 
two response choices.  Subjects were asked to decide which of the two choices (e.g., palm tree or pine 
tree) is the most closely related to the target item (e.g., pyramid).  Impaired performance on both the 
visual and verbal formats of the PPT has been found consistently in patients with semantic dementia 
(Bozeat et al., 2000; Hodges et al., 1992; Lambon-Ralph et al., 1998, 1999; Mummery et al., 1999, 
2000). 
 
2.  Verb Similarity Task (VST; Price, C.C., 2002) - The VST uses a forced-choice, 2-alternative format 
based on low to high synonym frequency.  This computerized task presents a target word centrally 
above two words.  The participant is required to choose which of these two words is most similar in 
meaning to the word above.  During the creation of this task, effort was made to control for a verb’s 
semantic representation (verb of motion, verb of cognition, verb of perception) and argument structure 
(transitive vs. intransitive verb).  Argument structure was considered especially important as transitive 
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verbs and those capable of accepting two different kinds of complements have been identified as 
difficult to process alone and within sentences (Collina, Marangolo, & Tabossi, 2001; Fodor et al., 
1968).   
To identify the semantic representation of each target word, 58 individuals (English first 
language; 35 undergraduate students; 23 older adults) were asked to categorize 187 verbs as either a 
verb of motion or a verb of perception/ cognition.  From this set, 50 verbs were identified (25 verbs of 
motion, 25 perception/cognition verbs).  Together, these 50 verbs included 25 transitive verbs, 19 
intransitive, and 6 verbs that could be either transitive or intransitive depending on sentence role.  The 
force-choice responses for the task were identified from a normative database in which undergraduate 
students (n=86; English first language) were asked to listen to each target verb and immediately list at 
least five associated verbs.  The participants were provided with practice examples (i.e., “The verb 
SNEEZE might generate the verbs BLOW and SNIFF”) prior to administration of the task.  The 
correct answer and competing foils were selected according to frequency of response.  The original 50 
word pairs were reduced to 48 following identification that normal controls were performing at less 
than chance on 2 of the word items. Thus, in total, 48 items from this locally collected set were used as 
experimental stimuli for the verb task.  Items were randomized, as was the right vs. left location of the 
correct force-choice responses.   
All targets and force-choice responses are matched for English corpus frequency and for a 5:1 
verb/noun ratio using Francis and Kacera (1982) norms [frequency F(2, 141)=1.80, ns;  Verb/noun ratio 
F(2,141) = .718, ns].  In addition, all targets and responses are matched in English corpus frequency to 
that of the Pyramid and Palm Tree Test [frequency t(298)=.181, ns].   
 
Executive Functioning 
1.  Boston Revision of the Wechsler Memory Scale - Mental Control Subtest (WMS-MC; Lamar et al., 
2002):  In addition to the three tasks comprising the standard WMS-MC subtest (counting backwards 
from 20 to 1, reciting the alphabet, and adding serial threes), the Boston Revision of the Mental 
Control subtest includes three additional tasks:  reciting the months of the year forward and backward, 
an alphabet rhyming task that requires the patient to identify letters that rhyme with the word “key”, 
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and an alphabet visualization task that requires patients to identify all block letters that contain curved 
lines.   
The dependent variable on this task is an accuracy index (AcI) derived from the three non-
automatized tasks from the WMS-MC (months backward, alphabet rhyming, and alphabet 
visualization).  This accuracy index is based on the following algorithm:  AcI = {1-[(false positives + 
misses) / possible correct]} x 100.  This algorithm yields a percentage score ranging from 0 to 100, 
such that patients obtaining a score of 100% correctly identified all targets and made no false positive 
responses or misses.  Composite scores assessing performance on the non-automatized mental control 
tasks will be calculated by averaging the AcI for all respective tasks for each patient. 
 
2.  Controlled Oral Word Association (COWA; Spreen & Strauss, 1998:) Patients were given 60 
seconds to generate words beginning with a specified letter (i.e., ‘F’, ‘A, & ‘S’) excluding proper 
nouns. The dependent variable is total number of words.  
 
3. Trail Making Test Part B (Reitan, 1958):  Patients were shown a group of numbers (1-13) and letters  
(A-L) randomly distributed on a page. Patients were asked to use a pencil to connect these stimuli in 
ascending order by alternating between numbers and letters (e.g., 1A, 2B, 3C, etc.).  They were given a 
practice trial, and then asked to complete the test page.  Errors were corrected as the patient proceeded 
through the test, and the discontinuation time was 5 minutes.  The dependent variable was total number 
of seconds to completion or discontinuation.   
 
Delayed Verbal Recognition Memory 
1.  Philadelphia Repeatable Verbal Learning Test (P(r)VLT; Price, C.C., Garrett, K.L., Cosentino, 
S.A., Jefferson, A.L., Penney, D.L., Kaplan, E., Swenson, R.,
 
Thomas, D., & Libon, D. J., 2002).  The 
PrVLT is a 9-word, 5 trial, list-learning task modeled after the 9-word California Verbal Learning Test, 
(CVLT; Delis, Kramer, Kaplan, & Ober, 1987; Libon et al., 1996) specifically designed to assess 
learning and memory in dementia.  The discriminability index on the recognition section was chosen as 
the dependent variable based on research carried out by Libon and colleagues (1998).  The authors 
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found the CVLT discriminability index (rather than other CVLT indices such as free recall) to 
correlate more highly with the volume of the hippocampus and parahippocampal gyrus, structures 
known to be involved in the learning of new information.   
 
Procedure 
Data Collection 
 At the outset of this study, it was proposed that all measures of semantic knowledge, 
executive function, and memory would be administered within six months of administration of the 
script test.  Given the practical demands on data collection including traveling to subjects’ homes that 
were often at great distances from the medical center, as well as subject discontinuation over time, this 
criterion was not met for all subjects.  As such, it was necessary in some cases to use scores that had 
been obtained six months to one year prior to administration of the scripts test (i.e., 2 patients with AD, 
one patient with BDD and one patient with SD).  Specifically, in the AD group these scores were for 
the Trail Making Test – Part B, Animal Naming, and the Pyramid and Palm Trees Test (PPT).  In the 
SD group, the scores were for the MMSE and FAS.  Finally, in the BDD group, the scores were for 
PPT, FAS, and Trail Making Test – Part B.  This is less than ideal since patients’ level of performance 
on these measures may have been lower at the time at which the scripts test was administered.  
However, given the few number of subjects for which this was the case, it is unlikely that these scores 
will significantly influence correlational analyses.                     
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CHAPTER 3:  RESULTS 
 
Overall Performance on the Scripts Test 
 A one-way ANOVA with a group (4 – NC, AD, SD, BDD) X error design was used to 
analyze between group differences in overall performance on the Scripts Test.  The main effect of 
diagnostic group was significant, F (3, 55) = 9.08, p < .001.  Post hoc analyses using a Student-
Newman-Keuls procedure (p < .05) revealed that all patient groups performed significantly lower than 
normal controls on the Scripts Test (M = 61.60, SD = 2.75).  Out of 66 possible points, patients with 
BDD obtained the lowest average performance (M = 43.50, SD = 12.08), scoring significantly lower 
than patients with AD (M = 52.33, SD = 10.64).  Scores obtained by patients with SD (M = 48.38, SD 
= 10.16) were not statistically different from either the AD or BDD groups.  Please see Table 6 for a 
full listing of these scores as well as the minimum and maximum scores in each group. 
 Non-parametric tests were also conducted to compare the number of subjects in each 
diagnostic group who displayed significant impairment on the scripts test, defined as performance two 
standard deviations or more below the average of normal control subjects.  Chi square analyses 
revealed no significant difference in the number of patients with BDD (75.0%; n = 9), SD (84.6%; n = 
11), or AD (60.0%; n = 9) scoring in the significantly impaired range, x2 (2, N = 40) = 2.170, p = .338.   
 
Hypothesis I 
 A 4 X 2 multivariate analysis of variance, with a group (4 - NC, AD, SD, BDD) X error type 
(2 - sequencing, semantic foils), was used to examine group differences in sequencing versus semantic 
errors on the Scripts Test.  Results for the following analyses were considered significant at p < .05. 
There was a significant main effect for group, F (1, 55) = 13.56, p = .001.   As predicted, there was 
also a significant interaction effect for group by error type, F  (3, 55) = 5.36, p = .003.  To determine 
whether the predicted distribution of errors was seen within each individual group, follow up paired 
sample t tests were used to assess differences in the number of sequencing versus semantic errors in 
each group.  There was no statistical difference in the number of sequencing errors (M = 1.67, SD = 
1.89) and semantic errors (M = 1.67, SD = 1.18) made by normal control subjects. 
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As predicted, patients with BDD failed to identify a significantly greater number of 
sequencing errors (M = 12.08, SD = 7.38) than semantic errors (M = 7.08, SD = 5.63), t (12) = 3.79, p 
= .003.  Contrary to predictions, however, there was no significant difference in the number of 
semantic (M = 7.38, SD = 5.11) and sequencing errors (M = 7.54, SD = 5.49) identified by patients 
with semantic dementia, t (13) = .16, p = .88.  Also contrary to predictions, patients with AD did not 
identify significantly more sequencing errors (M = 6.33, SD = 6.23) than semantic errors (M = 4.73, 
SD = 3.52), t (15) = 1.72, p = .11.  Results are outlined in Table 7.   
Follow up independent sample t tests were also used to assess between group differences on 
sequencing and semantic errors in the three dementia groups.  Patients with BDD made significantly 
more sequencing errors than patients with AD, t (27) = 2.20, p = .04.  All other comparisons were not 
significant. 
 
Hypothesis II 
Patients with BDD were predicted to have greater difficulty identifying conceptually 
implausible sequences than physically implausible sequences.  Results for the following analyses were 
considered significant at p < .05.  A 4 X 2 multivariate analysis of variance with a group (4 – NC, AD, 
SD, BDD) X sequencing error type (2 – physically implausible, conceptually implausible) did not yield 
a significant main effect for group, F (1, 55) = .134, p = .72.  However, there was a significant 
interaction effect of group on sequencing error type, F (3, 55) = 3.71, p = .02.  Follow up t tests 
revealed that contrary to prediction, patients with BDD did not make more errors on scripts whose 
sequence was conceptually implausible (M = 5.83, SD = 4.04) than scripts whose sequence was 
physically implausible (M = 6.25, SD = 3.50).  Rather, it was patients with AD that demonstrated this 
predicted error pattern.  Patients with AD made significantly more sequencing errors for conceptually 
ordered scripts (M = 3.73, SD = 3.43) than for physically constrained scripts (M = 2.60, SD = 2.97), t 
(15) = 2.83, p = .01.  Neither patients with SD nor normal controls differed significantly across these 
error types.  Please see Table 8 for the full report of scores by each group.  
Follow up independent sample t tests were used to assess between group differences on 
sequencing and semantic errors in the three dementia groups.  Patients with BDD made significantly 
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more physically implausible errors than patients with AD, t (27) = 2.93, p = .01.  All other 
comparisons were not significant. 
 
Hypothesis III  
Patients with SD were predicted to make a greater number of object-based semantic errors 
than action-based semantic errors.  A 4 X 2 multivariate analysis of variance, with a group (4 – NC, 
AD, SD, BDD) X semantic error type (2 – object, action) design, yielded a significant main effect for 
group, F (1, 55) = 36.51, p < .001.  However, there was no interaction of group by semantic error type, 
F (3, 55) = 1.50, p = .23.  Contrary to predictions, follow-up paired sample t tests revealed that all 
groups, including normal control subjects, made significantly more action-based errors than object-
based errors.  Please see Table 9 for the full report of scores by each group.  There were no significant 
between group differences in object or action errors across the three dementia groups.   
 
Hypothesis IV 
 It was predicted that increased semantic errors on the scripts test would be associated with 
decreased performance on an index of semantic knowledge measures.  Similarly, it was predicted that 
increased sequencing errors on the scripts test would be associated with lower scores on an index of 
measures designed to assess executive abilities.  To test these hypotheses, bivariate, two-tailed, 
Pearson correlations were performed to assess the relationship between performance on script variables 
and various neuropsychological measures.  Individual tests of semantic knowledge and executive 
function were compiled into two separate neuropsychological indices.  These indices were created by 
converting all raw test scores into z-scores based on the mean and standard deviation of the age 
matched normal control group (Table 10).  Z-scores for all semantic and executive measures were 
averaged into two separate indices.   Correlations were conducted within each individual group, and 
results were considered significant at the .05 level.    
Within the Alzheimer’s group, total number of correct responses on the scripts test was 
positively correlated with performance on indices constructed to measure semantic knowledge (r = .92, 
p < .01) and executive functioning (r = .73, p = .01).  Increased script sequencing errors were 
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negatively correlated with both the executive index (r = -.74, p = .01) and the semantic index (r = -.89, 
p < .01).  Increased script semantic errors were also negatively correlated with performance on the 
executive (r = -.64, p = .04) and semantic indices (r = -.89, p < .01).  There was no significant 
correlation between performance on script variables and delayed verbal recognition memory. 
In patients with semantic dementia, total number of correct responses on the scripts test was 
positively correlated with performance on the semantic knowledge index only (r = .70, p = .02).  
Neither increased script semantic errors nor sequencing errors were correlated with scores on the index 
of semantic knowledge, executive functioning, or delayed verbal recognition memory. 
A third set of correlations was conducted within the BDD group.  Total number of correct 
responses on the scripts test was positively correlated with performance on the executive control index 
only (r = .60, p = .05).  Neither increased script semantic errors nor sequencing errors were correlated 
with scores on the index of semantic knowledge, executive functioning, or delayed verbal recognition 
memory.  Please see Table 11 for comprehensive correlational results for each group. 
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CHAPTER 4:  DISCUSSION 
Originally defined by computer programmers as chains of causal inferences that connect 
stereotypic action sequences (Schank & Abelson, 1977), scripts are now thought of as hierarchically 
organized, meaning based, large-scale knowledge structures (Allain et al., 1999; Buxbaum et al., 1997; 
Cazalis et al., 2001; Funnell, 2001; Godbout & Doyon, 1995, 2000; Grafman, 1989; Grafman et al., 
1991; Lojek-Osiejuk, 1996; Sirigu et al., 1995, 1996; Wood & Grafman, 2003).  As multi-step plans, 
scripts appear to guide much of human thought and behavior, allowing for goal directed and purposeful 
action.  Despite the frequency and importance of scripts in everyday life, the neuropsychological basis 
by which scripts are enabled and represented is not well understood. Given the hierarchical and 
sequential organization of actions within a script, initial studies hypothesized that scripts were 
represented in the prefrontal cortex as this neurologic area has been associated with the organization of 
goal directed thought and behavior (Fuster, 1997; Grafman, 1989; Luria 1966).  
Grafman’s model of script knowledge posits that scripts are stored as entire knowledge units, 
characterized by content and structure, in the prefrontal cortex (Grafman, 1989; Grafman et al., 1991; 
Wood & Grafman, 2003).  However, this has not been consistent with patterns of script impairment 
seen in patients with prefrontal damage who demonstrate impaired sequencing of script actions, but 
maintained knowledge for the content of a script (Grafman et al., 1991; Sirigu et al., 1995, 1996).  
While these researchers and others have proposed a role for the temporal lobes in supporting the 
content of scripts (Funnel, 2001; Grafman et al., 1991; Sirigu et al., 1995; 1996), there has been no 
systematic exploration of this hypothesis. 
The current study proposed a model of script knowledge characterized by the interaction of 
two large-scale neural networks.  This model is derived from previous research that has dissociated 
knowledge for script content from knowledge for script organization; it is also based on theoretical 
understandings regarding the organizational capacities of the prefrontal cortex and the role of the 
temporal cortex in sustaining semantic knowledge for objects.  In contrast to theories of scripts as 
unitary knowledge structures, the proposed model argues that the prefrontal cortex recruits semantic 
information about script content from the temporal cortex, and organizes this knowledge to direct 
meaningful, goal-directed, behavior.   
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The current study evaluated the extent to which the meaning and organization of scripts can 
be neurologically dissociated.  This was undertaken by assessing the manner in which disease of the 
prefrontal cortex (characterized by executive dysfunction) and temporal cortex (characterized by 
semantic impairment) differentially affects performance on a test of script knowledge.  It was predicted 
that patients with primarily executive deficits would evidence impaired script sequencing, while 
patients with semantic impairment would make errors pertaining to script content.  A secondary goal of 
the study was to investigate whether executive/processing demands are affected by the nature of script 
content.  It was predicted that patients with significant executive dysfunction would more easily 
identify physically implausible script sequences than conceptually implausible script sequences.  This 
was predicted based on the hypothesis that the latter would require greater abstraction, thus greater 
executive resources, to devise the correct arrangement of script actions.  It was also predicted that 
patients with semantic impairment would have greater difficulty recognizing errors of object 
substitution (e.g., “stove” versus “washing machine”) than action substitution (e.g., “throw” versus 
“lift”) within a script.  This prediction was based on the typical neuropsychological profile of patients 
with semantic dementia, and research supporting the differential neurologic representation of nouns 
and verbs to the temporal and prefrontal cortex respectively.   
 Finally, Hypothesis IV addressed the relationship between errors on the scripts test and 
performance on neuropsychological measures designed to assess semantic knowledge, executive 
functioning, and recognition memory.  Specifically, it was predicted that increased number of semantic 
errors on the scripts test would correlate with decreased performance on neuropsychological measures 
believed to assess semantic knowledge (Pyramid and Palm Trees Test-Word Version; Verb Similarities 
Task).  It was also predicted that increased number of sequencing errors would correlate with 
decreased performance on the Executive Index, a compilation of neuropsychological tests thought to 
measure a variety of skills including working memory, planning, and sequencing (Trail Making Test – 
Part B; FAS; Boston Revision of the WMS-Mental Control subtest).  Correlational analyses were 
conducted within each diagnostic group to determine if script errors were associated with selective 
cognitive deficits particular to patient groups.   
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Review of Findings 
 With regard to overall performance on the Scripts Test, all three patient groups performed 
significantly below normal controls.  Patients with BDD obtained the lowest average performance, 
scoring significantly lower than patients with AD, and patients with SD obtained an average score 
between these two groups.  Chi square analyses revealed that the percentage of individuals in each 
dementia group obtaining an impaired score on the scripts test (73% on average) did not differ 
significantly different across group.  Without subsequent error analysis, the relatively equal frequency 
of impairment across dementia groups might implicate a common pathway of deteriorated script 
knowledge.  The aim of the first two hypotheses was to explore whether differential patterns of script 
errors emerged across patient groups. 
 
Behavioral Disorder / Dysexecutive Group 
Of the three patient groups, the BDD group obtained the lowest average overall score on the 
scripts test.  Impaired scripts performance was correlated with decreased performance on the index of 
executive functioning only.  As the three patient groups were equated for overall level of dementia 
severity based on the MMSE, it appears that the scripts test requires an aspect of executive processing 
not measured by the MMSE.  Script error analysis revealed that in accord with the first hypothesis, 
patients with BDD were significantly less likely to detect sequencing errors than semantic errors within 
a script.  They were also found to make significantly more sequencing errors than patients diagnosed 
with AD.  The disproportionate number of sequencing errors made by patients with BDD is consistent 
with a large body of literature that links sequencing and organizational deficits to compromise of the 
prefrontal cortex (Fuster, 1980, 1997; Luria, 1966; Smith & Jonides, 1999; Stuss & Benson, 1984).  
This finding also supports the notion that patients with prefrontal damage typically display preserved 
knowledge for the semantic content of a script (Grafman et al., 1991; Sirigu et al., 1995, 1996).  This 
dissociation in error types offers objective evidence that the processing of a script’s organizational 
structure can deteriorate in the context of preserved knowledge for the content of a script.   
 A second important implication of these findings extends to earlier studies that frequently 
used script generation tasks to measure impaired script knowledge (Godbout & Doyon, 1995, 2000; 
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Grafman et al., 1991; Sirigu et al., 1995; 1996).  Intended to measure script knowledge, such 
generation tasks required subjects to name actions within a specified script, unfortunately confounding 
the skills of verbal retrieval, working memory, semantic knowledge, and maintenance of mental set.  
To reduce these confounds and more directly measure script knowledge, the current study used a 
recognition format requiring patients simply to decide whether or not a script “makes sense”.  The fact 
that patients with BDD had significant difficulty detecting errors in script organization adds important 
information to the existing literature since such errors cannot be attributed to deficits in information 
retrieval or online organization.  That is, this finding suggests that patients with prefrontal compromise 
have a fundamental deficit in processing the organizational structure of a script.   
Hypothesis IIA predicted that patients with BDD would have greater difficulty identifying 
conceptually implausible script sequences than physically implausible sequences.  Contrary to 
prediction, however, patients with BDD had an equal amount of difficulty detecting both types of 
sequencing errors.  Assuming that the distinction between these types of sequences is valid, this 
finding suggests that action sequencing can be selectively impaired, regardless of the semantic content 
of the script actions.    
Impaired ability to recognize sequencing errors in this patient group is consistent with a 
functional neuroimaging study conducted by Crozier and colleagues (1999).  The authors examined 
prefrontal activity in a group of young adult, right-handed, normal controls (N=8) asked to detect 
ordering errors in two types of tasks.  In the syntax task, subjects were shown two sentence fragments 
(e.g., the message twice / announced was).  In the script task, subjects were shown two actions within a 
script (e.g., get dressed / take a shower).  While performance on both tasks was associated with 
activation in areas previously implicated in language functioning, the script task yielded a more 
extensive neural network.  The syntax task was associated primarily with left-sided activation of areas 
including the premotor area, posterior middle frontal gyrus, inferior frontal gyrus, temporal sulcus, and 
supramarginal gyrus.  Areas of activation on the script task overlapped with these regions, and 
extended to additional left and right-sided prefrontal activation (middle frontal gyrus, supplementary 
motor area, and inferior frontal gyrus) and parietal activation (left angular gyrus).  Crozier and 
colleagues speculated that the role of bilateral prefrontal activation in the script condition might be 
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specific to the sequencing of actions or events, and could reflect subjects’ visualization of performing 
the script.  In fact, subjects reported that they made decisions on the accuracy of a script by imagining 
themselves completing the two actions in the stated order.   
Interestingly, the authors conclude that knowledge for events is represented in a long-term 
memory network within the prefrontal cortex.  While their imaging findings certainly indicate 
prefrontal areas as crucial regions in the sequencing of events, it is not entirely clear that the neurologic 
representation of an entire script is actually stored in these areas.  In making this conclusion, the 
authors minimize the role of the numerous temporal and parietal regions that were activated in 
conjunction with prefrontal areas, but were not analyzed as part of their study.  In fact, findings from 
the current study suggest that prefrontal compromise can be associated with impaired sequencing in the 
context of spared knowledge for script content.   
 
Semantic Dementia 
Hypothesis IB addressed the extent to which patients with presumed damage to temporal 
cortex evidence differential loss for the semantic content of a script, in contrast to relatively preserved 
sequencing abilities.  Contrary to predictions, patients with SD demonstrated a relatively equal number 
of semantic and sequencing errors on the scripts test.  Although this is not consistent with the proposed 
model of script processing, there are several factors that might explain this finding.  One potential 
explanation is that these patients made sequencing errors secondary to degraded semantic knowledge.  
That is, since the test was presented in verbal rather than pictorial format, patients with impaired 
language processing are at a disadvantage for recognizing errors in sequencing as well as semantic 
content.   If script errors were made secondary to semantic impairment, overall performance on the 
scripts test might be expected to correlate with performance on the index of semantic knowledge rather 
than executive functioning, despite the fact that this group made an equal number of semantic and 
sequencing errors.  In fact, in the SD group, overall performance on the scripts test was correlated with 
performance on the index of semantic knowledge only.  This is in contrast to the BDD group whose 
overall scripts performance was correlated with impaired executive functioning, suggesting that the 
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primary cognitive deficits characteristic of each diagnostic group selectively lowered each group’s 
performance on the scripts test. 
A second factor that might explain why patients with SD did not make a disproportionate 
number of semantic errors is that the overall semantic context of the script may have facilitated 
interpretation of the meaning of objects and actions.  That is, the script may have provided contextual 
semantic cues that are not necessarily available when patients are asked to identify the meaning of 
objects or actions presented in isolation.  This idea is consistent with the theory of semantic knowledge 
discussed by Funnell (2001), who theorizes that scripts organize information regarding objects and 
their use, offering functional cues that are absent when objects or actions are presented in isolation.  
Funnell argues,  
Classic models of conceptual representations in semantic memory…reflect the general 
encyclopedic nature of the information, stripped of specific associations with real-world 
knowledge.  Outside the clinic, however, objects are used and referred to more often in 
context…names of objects, places, and people are uttered generally in the context of 
sentences that convey information about events, relationships, and plans, rather than as single 
names for object reference. (p. 323)   
 
Although Funnell suggests that these contextual cues are offered through the actual execution of a 
script, it may be that even the cognitive processing of a script can trigger information regarding the 
meaning of an object or action.   
Patients with SD were also predicted to make a greater number of object-based semantic 
errors than action-based semantic errors.  This was based on research pointing to the role of the frontal 
cortex in processing the meaning of actions, while the temporal cortex is more involved in object 
knowledge (Bak et al., 2001; Cappa et al., 1998; Damasio & Tranel, 1993; Zeki, 1991).  Contrary to 
predictions, all groups, including normal control subjects, made significantly more action-based errors 
than object-based errors.  The fact that normal control subjects made more action errors suggests that 
there was an artificial effect of the test stimuli.  It is possible that action errors were more subjective 
than script errors, and could have been interpreted as plausible script actions (e.g., several subjects 
commented that some cultures “toss” their glass to make a toast, and that a graduate could “step” on 
his or her cap to celebrate).   
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Alzheimer’s Disease 
Patients with AD obtained the highest overall average performance on the scripts test when 
compared with the two frontotemporal dementia groups, scoring significantly higher than patients with 
BDD.  This may reflect the fact that the scripts test did not place demands on learning and memory, 
primary areas of neuropsychological impairment in this patient population.   In fact, overall scripts 
performance in this group was correlated with both the executive and semantic indices, and was not 
correlated with the index of recognition memory.   
Based on the typical neuropsychological profile of patients with Alzheimer’s disease, it was 
predicted that these patients would evidence greater difficulty recognizing semantic errors than 
sequencing errors on the scripts test.  Contrary to predictions, patients with AD evidenced a relatively 
equal number of each error type.  As mentioned above, it is possible that this group made sequencing 
errors secondary to degraded semantic knowledge given the verbal modality of the task.  In fact, 
increased sequencing errors in this group were correlated with performance on both the executive and 
semantic indices, suggesting that identifying incorrectly arranged actions in verbal format relies not 
only on executive functions such as organizational abilities, working memory, and sequencing skills, 
but draws from semantic knowledge as well.   
The relatively equal number of semantic and sequencing errors in this population may also 
reflect the fact that patients with AD suffer from compromise to both the temporal and prefrontal 
cortex.  Although it was predicted that there would be relatively greater semantic impairment than 
executive impairment, it is well known that Alzheimer’s patients evidence significant deficits in both 
cognitive domains in the moderate stages of the disease.  This is supported by the fact that overall 
impairment on the scripts test in this group correlated with decreased performance on both the 
semantic and executive indices.   
 
Script Knowledge and the Prefrontal Cortex:  Processing versus Representational Theories  
Collectively, findings from the current study implicate the involvement of at least two large-
scale neural networks in sustaining script knowledge, and suggest that there are multiple pathways by 
which this knowledge can deteriorate.  This was made most evident by the disproportionate number of 
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script sequencing versus semantic errors made in patients with disease of the prefrontal cortex.  
Although the opposite pattern was not observed in patients with presumed temporal lobe deterioration, 
current findings suggest that impaired semantic knowledge may have affected performance on all 
aspects of the scripts test given its administration in verbal format.  Further, it is clear that performance 
on the scripts test was influenced by selective neuropsychological deficits characteristic of each patient 
group. 
Taken together, current results argue for a multidimensional view of script knowledge that is 
inconsistent with the view that scripts are stored as unitary knowledge structures in the prefrontal 
cortex (Wood & Grafman, 2003).  In a recent review of theories of prefrontal function, Wood and 
Grafman (2003) argue for the representational nature of the prefrontal cortex (PFC).  The authors 
theorize that rather than serving as a non-specific processor of information as implied by several 
processing theories, the PFC stores specific representations, or memories, in a manner similar to 
posterior cortical areas.  The authors maintain that scripts, or structured event complexes (SECs), are 
stored as permanent units of memory within the PFC and are encoded and retrieved as single episodes.  
A major implication of this model is that there is a redundant store of semantic information throughout 
the brain, as the content of a script (e.g., use the key to start the car) is theoretically also represented 
through object knowledge supported by the lateral temporal cortex (e.g., the purpose of a key is to start 
a car).   
In support of this representational viewpoint, Wood and Grafman (2003) highlight functional 
neuroimaging findings that localized processing of basic semantic information and SECs to different 
areas of the prefrontal cortex (Wood, Romero, Makale, & Grafman, 2003).  In this study, 20 right-
handed healthy young adults were asked to classify two types of stimuli (semantic and SEC) as social 
or non-social.  Subjects were shown single words in the semantic condition (e.g., MENU), and phrases 
in the SEC condition (e.g., GOING OUT TO DINNER).  In accord with the authors’ predictions, 
judgments regarding non-social semantic stimuli were associated with activation of the left inferior 
frontal gyrus, with more widespread activation seen in the social semantic condition.  Judgments 
regarding SECs activated different prefrontal areas, and also varied depending on whether they 
pertained to social versus non-social activities.  While performance on the social SEC task was 
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associated with activation in the left superior frontal gyrus, processing of non-social SECs was 
associated with activation in the right superior and left medial frontal gyri, and bilateral anterior 
cingulate. In general, the authors interpreted these findings as evidence that SECs are stored as 
independent episodes in the prefrontal cortex, separate from representation of discrete semantic 
information.   
However, a major limitation to these conclusions is that the authors focused their attention to 
the PFC only, and chose not to incorporate findings regarding activation in the temporal cortex, similar 
to the earlier discussed interpretations made by Crozier and colleagues (1999).  While performance on 
SEC tasks was associated with frontal activation as described above, the left middle temporal gyrus 
was also significantly activated during both the semantic and SEC tasks.  As such, it was not clear that 
SECs were represented entirely in the prefrontal cortex.   In fact, findings from the current study argue 
that while the prefrontal cortex plays an important role in organizing information in a script, it is 
possible that information comprising semantic content is recruited from temporal cortex.     
 
Functional Implications 
As the current study focused on script “knowledge”, it is difficult to specify how findings 
might apply to patients’ actual ability to carry out various scripts in daily life.   However, it is 
reasonable to conclude that if insult to the prefrontal cortex affects organizational capacity while 
sparing knowledge for script content, it may be possible to devise intervention strategies specifically 
aimed at improving script organization in a subset of patients.  In fact, O’Callaghan & Couvadelli 
(1998) investigated the efficacy of creating individualized scripts for a patient with bilateral damage to 
frontal cortex and subsequently impaired organizational and problem solving skills.  Building on 
theories of internal speech put forth by Vygotsky (1962) and Luria (1962, 1980), the authors predicted 
that providing the patient with detailed written instructions regarding a specific activity would improve 
his ability to execute these activities effectively.  That is, the authors speculated that strengthening the 
connections between actions verbally would result in improved connectivity of actions motorically and 
behaviorally.  The investigators found that after one month of training, the patient evidenced fewer 
instances of becoming “stuck” on a specific step, and displayed more systematic problem solving 
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overall.  It was concluded that verbal intervention enabled behavioral improvement in part by 
facilitating active versus passive directed attention to each action within a script.   
Ideally, this type of intervention would be beneficial in dementia populations who evidence 
compromised planning and organizational abilities.  In fact, O’Callaghan and Couvadelli (1998) 
remarked that similar, less formal, interventions were effectively used to facilitate routine behaviors 
(transfers and use of a walker) in a patient with Parkinson’s disease and another patient with mild 
dementia.  Strengthening explicit knowledge for the order of script actions may also prove effective in 
maintaining more elaborate behaviors, such as taking a shower, doing the laundry, or using the 
computer.  Prolonging patients’ ability to maintain these independent activities of daily living would 
undoubtedly improve their quality of life, reduce psychological distress, and lighten caregiver burden. 
 
Limitations and Future Directions  
 There are several limitations to the current study that warrant mention.  A primary limitation 
concerns the administration the scripts test in verbal format.  In evaluating subjects’ tendency to make 
sequencing errors, it was necessary to simultaneously consider their ability to comprehend the verbal 
stimuli and make semantic judgments of each action.  As such, an error in sequencing may have been 
secondary to a primary language deficit.  In fact, correlational analyses suggested that this may have 
occurred in patients with AD.  In order to address this confounding variable, a visual format of the test 
was developed in conjunction with the verbal format.  Given the practical restraints on data collection, 
it was unrealistic to administer both formats for the current study.  However, a separate ongoing study 
is being conducted to assess differences in performance between the verbal and visual format of the 
scripts test in these diagnostic groups.  
A second limitation to the current findings pertains to the validity of the selected 
neuropsychological indices as measure of semantic knowledge or executive function.  In fact, it is 
likely that each index assessed both cognitive domains, potentially accounting for the absence of 
significant correlations between specific types of script errors and the respective neuropsychological 
index.  For example, it is reasonable to assume that the impulsivity and executive dysfunction 
characteristic of the BDD group influenced their performance on tests designed to measure semantic 
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knowledge.  That is, patients with impulsive responding could be expected to have difficulty providing 
accurate responses on the Pyramid and Palm Trees Test, a measure which requires them to select one 
of two responses most closely related to the target item.  As both possible responses share some 
semantic relation to the target item, subjects must inhibit a plausible response for a slightly better 
response.  Similarly, one of the executive measures, the Boston Revision of the WMS-Mental Control 
subtest, includes items placing demands on semantic knowledge (e.g., name the months of the year in 
reverse order).  As such, patients with SD could be expected to obtain low scores on this measure even 
in the context of intact executive skills.   
A third factor that is important to address is the lack of neuroimaging or neuropathological 
confirmation of the diagnoses assigned to patients in the study.  As such, it was necessary to infer 
regions of neurologic degeneration from patients’ clinical presentations.  As is frequently the case in 
dementia populations, there is typically some degree of overlap in the neurologic and 
neuropsychological impairment across various diagnostic subtypes.  The progressively global nature of 
these degenerative diseases makes it particularly difficult to control entirely for these factors.  As such, 
it is frequently difficult to find clear-cut differences, which would be predicted on theoretical bases, on 
formal neuropsychological testing.  This may help to explain the failure to find the predicted difference 
in semantic and sequencing errors made in patients with AD and SD.   
 Finally, it is important to recognize that the current study assesses the cognitive components 
of script knowledge, and does not address patients’ abilities to actually carry out scripts in everyday 
life.  The relationship between cognitive and functional script knowledge is not entirely clear.  
Research has demonstrated that an individual’s ability to use an instrument correctly is not necessarily 
correlated with their ability to explicitly state the purpose of an object (Buxbaum et al., 1997).  As 
such, further research is needed to investigate the extent to which deteriorated script “knowledge” can 
predict functional deficit.  Ideally, improved understanding of the neuropsychological processes 
supporting script knowledge will inform treatment of impaired ability to perform scripts in various 
clinical populations.   
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Table 1.  Demographic Information for Pilot Data 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
   M  SD         Minimum         Maximum 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Age   73.71  2.50  70   78 
 
Education  15.29  2.22  12   18 
(years) 
 
MMSE   28.71  1.11  27   30 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
Note. MMSE = Mini-Mental State Examination (Folstein, Folstein, & McHugh, 1975). 
 
 
 
Table 2. Average Word Length and Frequency across Error Subgroups 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
   Error Subgroups  F    U    z    p 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
  Object   Action 
 
Length  13.73 (1.62)  14.58 (1.5)  46.50 -1.94 .052 
  
Frequency 142.18 (83.47)  139.09 (57.85) 1.43   .244 
 
     
  Physical   Conceptual   
 
 
Length  14.54 (1.94)  13.70 (.82)  43.50 -1.36 .186 
  
Frequency 119.37 (55.92)  163.71 (78.02) 0.345   .563 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
Note.  Object = Semantic error in which the incorrect object is used.  Action = Semantic error in which 
the incorrect action is performed.  Physical = Sequencing error in which script sequence is physically 
implausible.  Conceptual = Sequencing Error in which script sequence is conceptually implausible.  
Length = Number of words per script.  Frequency =  Frequency of words in written English language  
From Lexicon and Grammar, Frequency Analysis of English Usage by W. Nelson Francis & H. 
Kucera, 1982.  Houghton Mifflin Company:  Boston, MA. 
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Table 3. Average Script Frequency, Familiarity & Flexibility across Error Subgroups  
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
   Error Subgroups      U    z    p 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
  Object   Action 
 
Frequency 3.38 (1.19)   2.55 (.74)  27.50 -1.94 .05 
  
Familiarity 4.88 (.17)   4.65 (.38)    34.50  -1.58 .11 
 
Flexibility 4.11 (.79)  4.45 (.47)  42.50 -0.89 .39 
 
     
  Physical   Conceptual   
 
 
Frequency 2.92 (.98)   2.98 (1.19)  52.00 -0.14 .89 
  
Familiarity 4.75 (.37)   4.78 (.25)    47.00  -0.55 .59 
 
Flexibility 4.37 (.55)  4.18 (.78)  47.50 -0.47 .64 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
Note.  Object = Semantic error in which the incorrect object is used.  Action = Semantic error in which 
the incorrect action is performed.  Physical = Sequencing error in which script sequence is physically 
implausible.  Conceptual = Sequencing Error in which script sequence is conceptually implausible.  
Frequency =  Frequency of performing the script in present time.  Familiarity = Familiarity with 
actions involved in the script.  Flexibility = Degree to which actions in script can be rearranged. 
 
 
 
Table 4. Average Item Centrality across Error Subgroups 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
   Error Subgroups      U    z    p 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
  Object   Action 
 
Centrality 1.99 (1.04)   2.31 (1.29)  948.50 -.88 .40 
(1-5) 
     
  Physical   Conceptual   
 
 
Centrality 1.83 (1.02)   2.55 (1.24)  667.00 -2.96 .00 
(1-5) 
  
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
Note.  Object = Semantic error in which the incorrect object is used.  Action = Semantic error in which 
the incorrect action is performed.  Physical = Sequencing error in which script sequence is physically 
implausible.  Conceptual = Sequencing Error in which script sequence is conceptually implausible.  
Centrality = Importance of each individual script action in completing the script goal  
(1 = Unimportant, and 5 = Very Important).  
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Table 5. Demographic Information by Group 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
   AD  SD          BDD         NC 
   (n = 15)  (n = 13)  (n = 12)  (n = 15) 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Age    73.73 (9.42) 67.15 (9.55) 67.42 (11.74) 72.00 (9.13) 
M (SD) 
 
Years of Education 13.64 (2.34) 15.23 (2.49) 15.78 (4.21) 15.40 (2.41) 
M (SD) 
 
MMSE   23.60 (4.44) 24.38 (2.40) 22.58 (6.42) 29.00 (1.07) 
M (SD) 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
Note. MMSE = Mini-Mental State Examination (Folstein, Folstein, & McHugh, 1975). 
 
 
 
Table 6.  Total Number Correct on the Scripts Test  
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Group          Raw                z              Minimum  Maximum 
      M (SD) 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Normal Controls   61.60 (2.75)      0.00         57         65 
 
AD                         52.33 (10.64)    -3.40         32            64    
 
SD                 48.38 (10.16)    -4.81         25         60 
 
BDD                   43.50 (12.08)          -6.58         32                       64 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Note. Total number of possible correct items on the Scripts Test is 66. 
 
 
 
Table 7.  Within Group Differences for Sequencing and Semantic Errors on Scripts Test 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Group       Sequencing  Semantic              n t p 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Normal Controls    1.87 (1.89)  1.67 (1.18) 15 0.36 .72 
 
AD                          6.33 (6.23)  4.73 (3.52) 15 1.72 .11 
 
SD                 7.54 (5.49)  7.38 (5.11) 13 0.16 .88 
 
BDD                   12.08 (7.38)  7.08 (5.63) 12 3.79 .00  
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
Note. Total number of possible sequencing errors = 22; semantic errors = 22. 
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Table 8.  Within Group Differences for Conceptually and Physically Implausible Errors 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Group      Conceptually   Physically              n t p 
   Implausible  Implausible 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Normal Controls   0.93 (1.10)  1.07 (1.10) 15 0.41 .69 
 
AD                         3.73 (3.43)  2.60 (2.97) 15 2.83 .01 
 
SD                 3.31 (3.20)  4.23 (2.74) 13 1.43 .18 
 
BDD                   5.83 (4.04)  6.25 (3.50)   12 0.89 .39 
_________________________________________________________________________________  
Note. Total possible number of conceptually implausible errors on scripts test = 11; physically 
implausible errors on scripts test = 11. 
 
 
 
Table 9. Within Group Differences for Object and Action Errors on Scripts Test 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Group       Object   Action               n t p 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Normal Controls     .27 (.59)   1.27 (1.16) 15 2.84 .01 
 
AD                         1.13 (1.77)  3.60 (2.38) 15 4.16 .00 
 
SD                 2.62 (2.99)  4.77 (2.80) 13 2.84 .02 
 
BDD                   2.83 (2.59)  4.17 (3.41)        12 2.40 .04 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
Note. Total possible number of object errors on scripts test = 11; action errors on scripts test = 11. 
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Table 10.  Neuropsychological Performance in Normal Control Subjects               
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Test   n Minimum           Maximum Mean               SD 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Verb Similarity Test 12 45  50  47.42                1.73 
 
PPT-Words  13 48  52  50.92  1.26 
 
FAS   13 26  73  45.38              15.31 
 
Trails B Time  13 57  138  98.08              19.53 
 
WMS-MC  13 76  100  92.31  7.69 
 
PVLT DI  13 83  100  96.31  5.02 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
Note.  PPT-Words = Pyramid & Palm Trees Test (Words); FAS = Controlled Oral Word Association 
Test; WMS-MC = Boston Revision of the WMS – Mental Control Subtest Non-Automatized Index; 
PVLT DI = Recognition discriminability index from the Philadelphia Repeatable Verbal Learning 
Test. 
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Table 11. Correlations between Script Errors and Neuropsychological Indices  
__________________________________________________________________________________
_
Alzheimer’s Disease 
 
Script Variables  Semantic Index  Executive Control Index       Recognition Index 
 
       n        r (p)            n       r (p)              n       r (p) 
Total Correct      11    .92 (.00)            11    .73 (.01)             15    .31 (.26) 
 
Semantic Errors      11  -.89 (.00)            11   -.64 (.02)             15   -.28 (.30)  
 
Sequencing Errors     11  -.89  (.00)            11    -.74 (.01)             15   -.26 (.35) 
 
 
Semantic Dementia 
 
Script Variables  Semantic Index  Executive Control Index       Recognition Index 
 
       n        r (p)           n       r (p)              n       r (p) 
Total Correct      10    .70 (.01)            11    .49 (.06)             13    .33 (.27) 
 
Semantic Errors      10  -.59 (.04)            11   -.41 (.10)             13   -.33 (.27)  
 
Sequencing Errors     10  -.60  (.04)            11    -.54 (.04)             13   -.35 (.24) 
 
 
(Table 11 continued) 
 
Behavioral Disorder/Dysexecutive 
 
Script Variables  Semantic Index  Executive Control Index       Recognition Index 
 
       n        r (p)            n       r (p)              n       r (p) 
Total Correct       7    .54 (.11)            11    .60 (.03)             12   -.36 (.25) 
 
Semantic Errors       7   -.35 (.22)            11   -.28 (.21)             12   -.18 (.57)  
 
Sequencing Errors      7   -.43  (.17)            11    -.58 (.03)             12   -.40 (.20) 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
Note.  Semantic Index = Compiled Z scores for Pyramid & Palm Trees Test (Words); Verb Similarities 
Task.  Executive Control Index = Compiled Z scores for Boston Revision of the WMS – Mental 
Control Subtest Non-Automatized Index; FAS; Total Trails B time.   
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APPENDIX A:  SCRIPTS TEST ITEMS 
 
 
 
 
       1.  Going Camping 
 
1.    Pack food and supplies 
2. Look at compass 
3. Hike to campsite  
4. Sleep in tent 
 
2. Going on Vacation 
 
1. Visit travel agent 
2. Pack suitcase 
3. Sit in plane 
4. Look through binoculars at scenery  
 
3. Barbecuing a Cheeseburger 
 
1. Pour charcoal  
2. Light charcoal 
3. Flip hamburger with spatula 
4. Place cheese on hamburger 
 
4.   Going to a Play 
 
1. Check calendar for show time 
2. Give ticket to attendant 
3. Watch performance 
4. Hand flower to performer 
 
5.   Going out to Eat 
 
1. Call restaurant for reservations 
2. Check in with hostess 
3. Lift glass to toast 
4. Eat ice cream 
 
6.   Baking a Birthday Cake 
 
1. Remove ingredients from cabinet 
2. Mix ingredients 
3. Place pan in oven 
4. Stick candles on cake 
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7.   Selling a Car 
 
1. Wash car with sponge 
2. Wax car 
3. Place price tag in window   
4. Collect money 
 
8.  Going Fishing  
 
1. Walk to pond with fishing rod 
2. Place worm on hook 
3. Cast fishing line 
4. Drop fish in bucket 
 
9. Washing the Dishes 
 
1. Clear dishes from table 
2. Scrape food from dishes 
3. Wash dishes with sponge 
4. Dry dishes 
 
10. Throwing a Party 
 
1. Write invitations for event 
2. Drop invitations in mailbox 
3. Get dressed for party 
4. Entertain guests 
 
11. Wrapping a Gift 
 
1. Place gift in box 
2. Cut wrapping paper 
3. Wrap box 
4. Place bow on top of box 
 
12. Graduating from School 
 
1. Study class material 
2. Receive diploma 
3. Throw graduation cap in air 
4. Start new job 
 
13. Making a Necklace  
 
1. Lay out beads and ball of string 
2. Unravel string 
3. String beads together 
4. Place clasp on necklace 
 
14. Sending a Letter 
 
1.   Write message 
2. Put letter in envelope 
3. Seal envelope 
4. Place stamp on right corner of envelope 
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15.  Going to the Movies 
 
1. Check newspaper for movie schedule 
2. Approach movie theater 
3. Hand ticket to attendant 
4. Watch movie 
 
16.  Doing the Laundry 
 
1. Carry dirty clothes 
2. Load washing machine 
3. Load dryer 
4. Place folded clothes in laundry basket 
 
17. Grocery Shopping 
 
1. Check grocery list 
2. Push cart into store 
3. Take milk off shelf 
4. Pay cashier 
 
18. Making a Sandwich 
 
1. Lay out bread 
2. Spread mustard on bread 
3. Lay meat on bread 
4. Cut through sandwich with knife 
 
19.  Going Skiing 
 
1. Drive with skis on car 
2. Ride chair lift 
3. Stand on skis to go down mountain 
4. Drink hot chocolate 
 
20.  Painting a Picture 
 
1. Pour paint onto palette 
2. Place brush in paint 
3. Stroke canvas with brush 
4. Hang painting 
 
21.  Going to Work 
 
1. Wake with alarm clock 
2. Look in closet for clothes 
3. Iron shirt 
4. Sit at work 
 
22. Driving a Car 
 
1. Secure seatbelt 
2. Place key in ignition 
3. Check rearview mirror  
4. Drive car  
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APPENDIX B:  SEMANTIC ERRORS 
 
 
 
 
Script    Action Error 
 
Going Camping   Sleep on top of tent 
 
Going on Vacation  Look through binoculars at map 
 
Going out to Eat   Toss glass to toast 
 
Baking a Birthday Cake  Drop candles on cake 
 
Graduating from School  Step on graduation cap 
 
Making a Necklace  Tie string around jar of beads 
 
Sending a Letter   Place stamp on left corner of envelope 
 
Going to the Movies  Throw ticket to attendant 
 
Making a Sandwich   Place knife in between slices of bread 
 
Going Skiing   Sit on skis to go down mountain 
 
Painting a Picture   Stroke canvas with handle of brush 
 
 
 
Script     Object Error 
 
Barbecuing a Cheeseburger Use scissors to place cheese on hamburger 
 
Going to a Play   Hand carrot to performer 
  
Selling a Car   Wax car with rake 
 
Going Fishing   Place flower on hook 
 
Washing the Dishes  Wash dishes with mop 
 
Throwing a Party   Drop invitations in garbage can 
 
Wrapping a Gift   Place candle on top of box 
 
Doing the Laundry  Load stove 
 
Grocery Shopping  Push wheelbarrow into store 
 
Going to Work   Iron shirt with kettle 
 
Driving a Car   Place screwdriver in ignition 
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APPENDIX C:  SEQUENCING ERRORS 
 
 
 
 
Script    Physical Error 
 
Baking a Birthday Cake  Stick candles on cake BEFORE Mix ingredients 
 
Making a Necklace  String beads together BEFORE Unravel string 
 
Sending a Letter   Seal envelope BEFORE Put letter in envelope 
 
Going to the Movies  Watch movie BEFORE Approach theater 
 
Going Skiing                                     Stand on skis to go down mountain BEFORE Ride chair lift 
 
Painting a Picture   Place brush in paint BEFORE Pour paint on palette 
 
Going Fishing   Drop Fish in Bucket BEFORE Place worm on hook  
 
Driving a Car   Drive Car BEFORE Place key in ignition 
 
Grocery Shopping  Take milk off shelf BEFORE Push cart into store 
 
Throwing a Party                              Drop invitations in mailbox BEFORE Write invitations for event 
 
Wrapping a Gift   Wrap Box BEFORE Cut Wrapping Paper 
 
 
Script     Conceptual Error 
 
Going out to Eat   Lift glass to toast BEFORE Check in with hostess 
 
Making a Sandwich                          Cut through sandwich with knife BEFORE Lay meat on bread 
 
Graduating from School  Start new job BEFORE Throw graduation cap in air 
 
Going on Vacation  Pack suitcase BEFORE Visit travel agent 
 
Barbecuing a Cheeseburger Place cheese on hamburger BEFORE Flip with spatula 
 
Going to a Play   Hand flower to performer BEFORE Watch Performance 
  
Selling a Car   Wax car BEFORE Wash car with sponge 
 
Washing the Dishes                          Wash dishes with sponge BEFORE Scrape food from dishes  
 
Doing the Laundry                           Place folded clothes in laundry basket BEFORE Load dryer 
 
Going to Work   Sit at Work BEFORE Iron shirt 
 
Going Camping   Look at compass BEFORE Pack food and supplies 
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